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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA AND THE 
UNITED STATES: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEWt 
Kenneth M. Murchison* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The legal systems of Australia and the United States are attractive 
subjects for comparative study. In both nations, modern law has 
evolved from the English tradition. Moreover, the division of power 
between federal and state governments has followed a similar course 
of development in both countries. The constitution of each country 
limits the federal government to enumerated powers,! but federal 
power in both countries has expanded greatly in the twentieth cen-
tury.2 Although very real differences distinguish the two federations,3 
t An independently edited version of this Article was published in Australia in the Environ-
mental and Planning Law Journal. See 11 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 179 (pt. 1),256 (pt. 2) (1994). 
* J. Denson Smith Professor, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University; B.A. 
1969, Louisiana Polytechnic Institute; J.D. 1972, University of Virginia; M.A. 1975, University 
of Vll'ginia; J.D. 1988, Harvard Law School. This Article was written during the author's 
1992-1993 sabbatical leave while he was the Natural Resources Law Institute Fellow at the 
Northwestern School of Law at Lewis and Clark College. The author is grateful to William 
Andreen, Michael Blumm, and Gary Meyers for their critiques of earlier drafts of the Article. 
1 AUSTL. CONST. ch. I, pt. V, §§ 51, 52, ch. V, § 107; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, amend. 10. 
2 SIR ROBERT MENZIES, CENTRAL POWER IN THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION 2 (1967). Citing 
Lord Bryce, Menzies, former Australian Prime Minister, identifies this centripetal tendency as 
an inevitable distinguishing characteristic of federations. [d. Among federations from the Eng-
lish tradition, Canada is perhaps the most important contemporary example of the contrasting 
centrifugal tendency toward regionalization. See generally Richard Cullen, Canada and Aus-
tralia: A Federal Parting of the Ways, 18 FED. L. REV. 53 (1989). 
3 At least two important differences distinguish the constitutions of the United States and 
Australia. First, Australia has no guarantees of individual rights comparable to the Bill of Rights 
and Civil War Amendments of the United States Constitution. Second, Australia adopted a 
parliamentary form of government in which all ministers are members of, and responsible to, 
Parliament. This system of responsible government eliminates many of the separation of powers 
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the similarities are significant enough to encourage comparison.4 
Environmental law is a particularly inviting topic for comparative 
analysis in the 1990s. Australia and the United States share a tradi-
tion of cooperation with respect to environmental matters. An aca-
demic from Australia5 assisted the committee that drafted the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act of 1972,6 the statute that redefined 
the approach to water pollution control in the United States.7 More 
recently, environmentalists in the United States have applauded Aus-
tralian efforts to protect the nation's environmental treasures.s Like-
wise, Australians have long shown considerable interest in environ-
mental law developments in the United States.9 Indeed, the National 
Environmental Policy Act,lO the Endangered Species Act,ll and the 
issues that have been prominent in recent United States cases. For analyses of the differing 
traditions of judicial review in the two countries, see Sanford H. Kadish, Judicial Review in the 
United States Supreme Court and the High Court of Australia, 37 TEx. L. REV. 1 (pt. I), 37 
TEx. L. REV. 133 (pt. II) (1958); Geoffrey Sawer, The Supreme Court and the High Court of 
Australia, 6 J. PuB. L. 482 (1957). For a recent article suggesting that the doctrinal differences 
that result from these differences are far less significant than has been generally assumed, see 
William Rich, Converging Constitutions: A Comparative Analysis of Constitutional Law in the 
United States and Australia, 21 FED. L. REV. 202 (1993). 
Practical differences also exist between the two countries. Australia's much smaller popula-
tion and much larger states minimize the interstate impact of pollution. In addition, the estab-
lishment of intercolony trading routes and patterns prior to creation of the Commonwealth 
makes the interstate nature of trade less pervasive. See infra notes 114-19 and accompanying 
text. 
4 For a summary of some of the legal, political, and geographical similarities between Australia 
and the United States, see Brian G. Baillie Environmental Law and Litigation in the United 
States: An Australian's Impressions of America's New Legal Frontier, 5 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 
14, 15 (1988). 
6 See Walter E. Westman, Some Basic Issues in Water Pollution Control Legislation, 60 AM. 
SCIENTIST 767 (1972). 
6 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 896 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988 
& Supp. v 1993» 
7 See William L. Andreen, The Evolving Law of Environmental Protection in the United 
States: 1970-91, 9 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 96, 99-101 (1992); Jackson Battle, Environmental Law 
and Cooperative Federalism in the United States, 2 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 302, 309-12 (1985). 
8 Andreen, supra note 7, at 96 (discussing opposition to Tasmanian dams). 
9 See, e.g., id.; Battle, supra note 7; Michael C. Blumm, The Origin, Evolution and Direction 
of the United States National Environmental Policy Act, 5 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 179 (1988). 
10 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1988 
& Supp. 1993». For the author's view of the significance of the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) in the United States, see Kenneth M. Murchison, Does NEPA Matter? An Analysis 
of the Historical Development and Contemporary Significance of the National Environmental 
Policy Act, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 557 (1984); see also Symposium, NEPA at Twenty: The Past, 
Present and Future of the National Environmental Policy Act, 20 ENVTL. L. 447 (1990). 
11 Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 
& Supp. V 1993». 
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National Historic Preservation Act12 have all influenced statutes adopted 
in Australia.13 
More fundamentally, environmental law appears to be headed in the 
same direction in Australia and the United States. In the United States, 
the pressures of centralization have controlled the field of environ-
mental law since the 1970s. As a result, federal law has become the 
dominant force in environmental law, especially with respect to pol-
lution control and the response to releases of hazardous substances.14 
Though states remain the primary actors in the environmental arena 
in Australia,15 important changes occurred during the 1980s and the 
early years of the 1990s. During this period, the Australian High 
Court consistently sustained the Commonwealth's efforts to protect 
important natural resources.16 Moreover, a recent Memorandum of 
Agreement between the states and the Commonwealth created a 
federal Environmental Protection Authority.17 The memorandum an-
ticipates the establishment of national pollution-control standards, 
although the scope and significance of those standards has not yet 
been established. 
This Article offers a comparative overview of how selected envi-
ronmentallaw issues have been resolved in the United States and 
Australia. Sections II and III focus on governmental power: the re-
spective roles of federal governments and states in establishing, ad-
12 Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915 (1966) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470x-6 (1988 
& Supp. V 1993». 
13 See R.J. Fowler, Environmental Law and Its Administration in Australia, 1 ENVTL. & 
PLAN. L.J. 10, 22 (1984); Gary D. Myers, A Comparative View of Endangered Species Legisla-
tion in the United States and Australia: How Effective Are These Acts for Preserving Biodi-
versity?, in LEGISLATING FOR BIODIVERSITY 1, 16--59 (Environmental Defenders Office, Ltd., 
N.S.W. 1993) (1992); Kenneth Wiltshire, Heritage, in FEDERALISM AND THE ENVIRONMENT 47, 
48 (R. Mathews ed., 1985). But see Battle, supra note 7, at 305-06 (summarizing the differences 
between United States and Australian provisions for the assessment of environmental impacts). 
14 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter CWA]; 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901~992k (1988 & Supp. V 1993) 
[hereinafter RCRA]; Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter 
CAA]; Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. v 1993) [hereinafter CERCLA]. 
15 See generally GERRY M. BATES, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 68-74 (3d ed. 1992); 
Fowler, supra note 13. 
16 See Queensland v. Commonwealth, 167 C.L.R. 232 (Austl. 1989); Richardson v. Forestry 
Comm'n, 164 C.L.R. 261 (Austl. 1988); Commonwealth v. Tasmania, 158 C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1983); 
New South Wales v. Commonwealth, 135 C.L.R. 337 (Austl. 1975). 
17 See COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR ECOLOGICALLY SUSTAIN-
ABLE DEVELOPMENT, app. A (Summary of the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environ-
ment) at 117 (Dec. 1992) [hereinafter Summary of Intergovernmental Agreement]. 
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ministering, and enforcing environmental policies. Section IV compares 
how the two countries have established pollution-control standards, 
employed permit requirements, and enforced their environmental regu-
lations. Section V describes and compares the roles of agencies, courts, 
and the public with respect to the administration of environmental 
law in both countries. The concluding section combines a caution 
against unreflective borrowing with a description of the positive con-
tributions of the comparative study. The section summarizes the les-
sons each nation can learn from the other and lists some trends that 
seem to transcend national boundaries. 
II. FEDERAL POWER 
A. United States 
In the United States, the Supreme Court endorsed an expansive 
interpretation of federal regulatory power long before the explosion 
of environmental statutes occurred in the 1970s. Since the New Deal 
era,18 the Supreme Court has embraced a functional test which greatly 
augments congressional power to regulate interstate commerce.19 So 
long as an activity significantly affects interstate commerce, either by 
itself or as part of a class of activities,2° Congress may regulate the 
activity under the Constitution's Commerce Clause.21 Under this ap-
proach, congressional authority to enact national environmental regu-
lations is an easy question;22 environmental cases have, however, raised 
18 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,36-39 (1937) (sustaining Congress's 
power to regulate commerce and upholding National Labor Relations Act of 1935). 
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
20 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118--29 (1942). 
21 See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150-54 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 
U.S. 294, 301-05 (1964). The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to a Fifth Circuit 
decision holding unconstitutional the Gun-Free School Zones Act. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 
1342 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994). The decision of the Court of Appeals 
is the first significant judicial attempt since the New Deal to limit Congress's power to regulate 
interstate commerce. 
22 See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 129-31 (1985) 
(regulation of wetlands under Clean Water Act); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclama-
tion Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 275-83 (1981) (regulation of surface coal mining under Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act); United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 
1328-29 (6th Cir. 1974) (regulation of discharges into navigable tributaries under the Clean 
Water Act); South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 677-78 (1st Cir. 1974) (regulation of 
motor vehicle transportation under the Clean Air Act). 
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more difficult questions with respect to preemption23 and the reserved 
powers of the states.24 
As a practical matter, contemporary limits on federal power derive 
primarily from the protection that the Constitution provides for indi-
vidual rights. For environmental regulations, the Takings Clause is 
the most significant limitation,25 but other provisions can also be de-
cisive in particular contexts. For example, modern environmental 
cases have raised important constitutional questions regarding due 
process,26 search and seizure,27 the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion,28 and the right to a jury tria1.29 
Some older cases indicate that congressional power might be broader 
under other enumerated powers such as the treaty power,30 the spend-
ing power,31 and the war power.32 Today, the issues raised in those 
cases have only academic interest in the environmental context. As 
presently construed, the Commerce Clause is broad enough to author-
ize nearly any type of federal environmental regulation.33 
23 E.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 
U.S. 190,203-23 (1983) (nuclear energy); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157-78 (1978) 
(oil tankers); Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 626-40 (1973) (noise). 
24 U.S. CONST. amend. X; see, e.g., New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2417-32 (1992); 
United States v. Ohio Dept. of Highway Safety, 635 F.2d 1195, 1204-05 (6th Cir. 1980), cm. 
denied, 451 U.S. 949 (1981); Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 224-28 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated sub 
nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246, 259--63 (3d Cir. 1974). 
25 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 
(1992), analyzed in Kenneth M. Murchison, Review of Recent Developments: 1991-1992 Local 
Government Law, 53 LA. L. REV. 823, 854-61 (1993); see also Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. 
Ct. 332, 340-41 (1992); Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990), vacated, 
18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cm. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995). 
26 U.S. CONST. amend. v. Compare Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1517-24 (1st Cir. 
1991) (en banc) (finding denial of due process in CERCLA lien provision's failure to provide 
notice and pre-deprivation hearing to certain landowners) with Barmet Aluminum Corp. v. 
Reilly, 927 F.2d 289, 294-96 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding no denial of due process in CERCL.Ns 
pre-enforcement jurisdictional bar). 
27 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see, e.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986); 
Keisel Co., Inc. v. Householder, 879 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1989), cm. denied, 494 U.S. 1026 (1990); 
McLaughlin v. AB Chance Co., 842 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1988). 
28 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980); United States 
v. Mitchell, 966 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1992). 
29 U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987). 
30 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 & art. VI, cl. 2; Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see, e.g., Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947). 
32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; see, e.g., Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948). 
33 For a discussion of just how far the congressional power in environmental matters might 
extend, see Stephen M. Johnson, Federal Regulation of Isolated Wetlands, 23 ENVTL. L. 1 
(1993). See also Dennis J. Priolo, Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: The Case for Expansion 
of Federal Jurisdiction Over Isolated Wetlands, 30 LAND & WATER L. REV. 91 (1995) (exam-
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The expansion of federal power in the United States has resulted 
in a broad array of environmental statutes.34 Federal law now pre-
scribes environmental standards for air'l5 and water pollution,36 as well 
as for the management of hazardous wastes.37 Federal statutes also 
protect endangered species38 and wetlands,39 set aside wilderness ar-
eas,40 and designate scenic rivers.41 In addition, federal legislation 
partially funds the cleanup of sites containing hazardous substances 
and prescribes standards for holding private parties liable for clean-
up costS.42 
B. Australia 
Like the United States Constitution, the Australian Constitution 
enumerates the powers that are delegated to the federallegislature.43 
The list of powers delegated to the Commonwealth Parliament is 
considerably longer than the list of powers delegated to Congress, and 
includes important regulatory powers not found in the United States 
Constitution.44 Protection of the environment is not, however, one of 
the powers entrusted to Parliament, and a recent constitutional re-
form commission rejected a proposal for amending the Constitution to 
add environmental protection to the list of Commonwealth powers.45 
ining United States Army Corps of Engineers' regulatory jurisdiction over private landowners' 
wetlands). But see Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993) (EPA's Section 404 
regulations did not apply to isolated wetland). The Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act 
provides an unusual example of congressional reliance on a power other than the Commerce 
Clause to support an environmental statute. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). In 
a challenge to the Act, the Supreme Court broadly construed congressional power under the 
Property Clause. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; see Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976). 
34 See generally Andreen, supra note 7, at 98-105; Battle, supra note 7. 
as CAA 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q. 
36 CWA 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387. 
37 RCRA 42 U.S.C. §§ 6911-6939b. Federal controls over the disposal of nonhazardous solid 
waste are currently much less substantial, but those controls are likely to increase when 
Congress reauthorizes the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-
49a. 
33 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. v 1993) [hereinafter 
E.S.A.J. See generally Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
39 CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344; see United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 
(1985); Johnson, supra note 33. 
40 Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
41 Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
42 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675. 
43 AusTL. CONST. ch. I, pt. V, § 51. 
44 E.g., id. § 51(xiii) (banking), (xiv) (insurance), (xx) (foreign, trading, and financial corpora-
tions), (xxi) (marriage), (xxii) (matrimonial causes and child custody), (xxxv) (conciliation and 
arbitration for interstate labor disputes). 
45 BATES, supra note 15, at 53 n.1. 
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The Commonwealth's powers include the power to pass laws with 
respect to "[t]rade and commerce with other countries, and among 
the States,"46 but this power lacks the all-encompassing reach of con-
gressional power to regulate interstate commerce that exists in the 
United States. Australia has experienced no expansion of federal 
regulatory power over commercial matters comparable to the New 
Deal revolution in the United States.47 The Australian High Court's 
precedents allow direct regulation of production only if the Common-
wealth can show that the regulation is "incidental" to the effectuation 
of the object of the trade and commerce power.48 
Despite the contrast with the United States, a centralizing ten-
dency is discernable in Australian law even with respect to formal 
regulations. As early as 1920, the High Court acknowledged the Com-
monwealth's power to control the activities of states when the activi-
ties involved interstate commerce,49 and more recent decisions have 
interpreted Commonwealth powers expansively.50 Indeed, the combi-
nation of powers that the High Court has recognized in its decisions 
probably gives the Parliament greater regulatory powers over the 
environment than it is likely to use in the near future. 
Dean Crawford has summarized three principles of interpretation 
that establish the priority of federal regulatory power under the 
Australian Constitution.51 First, the powers conferred on the Com-
monwealth "are to be interpreted separately and disjunctively, with-
out any particular attempt being made to avoid overlap between 
them."52 Second, the powers conferred on the Commonwealth "are to 
be construed liberally in accordance with their terms, and without any 
46 AUSTL. CONST., ch. I, pt. V, § 51(i). 
47 See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). See generally W. 
SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TwENTIETH CENTURY: THE NEW LEGALITY, 
1932-1968 1-116 (1970). 
48 Leslie Zines, The Environment and the Constitution, in FEDERALISM AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT 13, 16-17 (R. Mathews ed., 1985). 
49 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co., 28 C.L.R. 129 (Austl. 1920); 
cf United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 183--87 (1936) (allowing federal government to 
impose safety regulations on railroad owned by a state). For a description of the unusual oral 
argument in the Engineers Case, by Sir Robert Menzies, the attorney who represented the 
union, see MENZIES, supra note 2, at 37-39. 
50 See, e.g., Mabo v. Queensland, 175 C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1992); Queensland v. Commonwealth, 167 
C.L.R. 232 (Austl. 1989); Richardson v. Forestry Comm'n, 164 C.L.R. 261 (Austl. 1988); Com-
monwealth v. Tasmania, 158 C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1983); Murphyores Inc. Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 
136 C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1975); Victoria v. Commonwealth, 134 C.L.R. 338 (Austl. 1975). 
51 James Crawford, The Constitution and the Environment, 13 SYDNEY L. REV. 11, 13-15 
(1991). 
52 [d. at 14. 
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assumption that particular matters were intended to be excluded 
from federal authority or 'reserved' to the States."53 Third, the Con-
stitution imposes "no requirement that Commonwealth legislation 
be exclusively about one of the granted heads of power" or that "in 
terms of its intent or practical effect, the legislation be primarily, 
predominately or even substantially concerned with the granted head 
of power."M 
A primary method for expanding Commonwealth power through-
out the twentieth century has been the federal government's domina-
tion of fiscal matters.55 Under the Australian Constitution, only the 
Commonwealth may levy customs and excise taxes.56 Since 1928, the 
Commonwealth has also exercised the preeminent voice in the Loan 
Council, which controls state borrowing. 57 During World War II, the 
Commonwealth gained sole control over income taxation,58 which it 
has never relinquished.59 Finally, the High Court has broadly inter-
preted the Commonwealth's power to make grants to the states60 and 
has recognized a spending power that is apparently broader than the 
Commonwealth's regulatory authority.61 
Federalism appears to have a more cooperative, or at least more 
conSUltative, character in Australia than in the United States. Per-
haps the concept of states' rights retains more appeal in Australia 
because the concept was never discredited by the institution of slav-
63 Id.; cf. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 291 (1981) 
("[This] Court long ago rejected the suggestion that Congress invades areas reserved to the 
States by the Tenth Amendment simply because it exercises its authority under the Commerce 
Clause in a manner that displaces the States' exercise of their police powers."). 
64 Crawford, supra note 51, at 14. 
5.5 RUSSEL BRADDOCK WARD, THE HISTORY OF AUSTRALIA: THE TwENTIETH CENTURY 157, 
253 (1977). In recent years, some commentators have suggested that modern budgetary deficits 
have greatly lessened the significance of Commonwealth fiscal power. See, e.g., Michael Crom-
melin, Commonwealth Involvement in Environmental Policy: Past, Present and Future, 4 
ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 101, 108-09 (1987). 
56 AUSTL. CONST. ch. IV, § 90. 
57 See PERCY ERNEST JOSKE, AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL GoVERNMENT 112-15 (3d ed. 1976); 
P.H. LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 38--39 (5th ed. 1990). 
58 South Australia v. Commonwealth, 65 C.L.R. 373 (Austl. 1942); see MENZIES, supra note 2, 
at 78--83. 
69 JOSKE, supra note 57, at 116-18, 121-22; LANE, supra note 57, at 36-38; MENZIES, supra, 
note 2, at 85-9l. 
60 AUSTL. CONST. ch. IV, § 96; see, e.g., Victoria v. Commonwealth, 99 C.L.R. 575 (Austl. 1957). 
See generally JOSKE, supra note 57, at 118--21; LANE supra note 57, at 33-35. 
61 AUSTL. CONST. ch. IV, § 81; see, e.g., Victoria v. Commonwealth, 134 C.L.R. 338 (Austl. 
1975); see also LANE, supra note 57, at 111-12. In the United States, the Supreme Court has 
ruled that congressional authority to appropriate funds "for the general welfare" is not limited 
to projects tied to one of the other powers conferred on Congress. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 
U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937). 
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ery. Or it may be that the smaller number of Australian states makes 
intergovernmental dialogue more feasible. Or perhaps the High Court's 
more restrained interpretation of the Commonwealth's regulatory 
powers has discouraged unilateral federal action. At any rate, formal 
consultation between the Commonwealth and state governments seems 
more common in Australia than federal-state dialogue in the United 
States. 
The Australian Constitution offers a variety of potential bases that 
might support federal intervention to protect the environment.62 Sec-
tion 51 authorizes Parliament to tax.63 Section 51 also authorizes Par-
liament to legislate generally with respect to interstate and foreign 
trade and commerce,64 foreign and trading corporations,65 external 
affairs,66 and territories.67 In addition, Section 51 authorizes Parlia-
ment to make special laws for any race that needs protection or 
assistance.68 Moreover, some commentators have urged the existence 
of an inherent power to regulate for the nation, without defining its 
precise limits; they derive this unenumerated power from the Com-
monwealth's "status as a 'national government."'69 
In contrast to the United States, modern environmental disputes 
have provided the context for testing the limits of federal authority 
in Australia. The Commonwealth has made little effort to use the 
taxing power in these cases, but the High Court has generally sup-
ported the expansion of the other regulatory powers enumerated in 
Section 51. In the Tasmanian Dam case, however, the High Court 
declined to embrace the inherent national powers theory with respect 
to environmental regulations.70 Nonetheless, non environmental cases 
indicate that the theory would support Commonwealth spending and 
grant projects.71 
62 See generally Zines, supra note 48. 
63 AUSTL. CONST. ch. I, pt. V, § 51(ii). 
64 ld. § 51(i). 
65 ld. § 51(xx). 
66 ld. § 51(xxix). 
671d. ch. VI, § 122. 
6S ld. ch. I, pt. V, § 51(xxvi). 
69 E.g., Zines, supra note 48, at 24. 
70 Commonwealth v. Tasmania, 158 C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1983). But see Australian Communist 
Party v. Commonwealth, 83 C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1951) (Dixon, J.) (suggesting that power to legislate 
against subversion is inherent national power). 
71 Victoria v. Commonwealth & Haydon, 134 C.L.R. 338 (Austl. 1975); Attorney-General for 
Victoria v. Commonwealth, 71 C.L.R. 237 (Austl. 1945); see LANE, supra note 57, at 111-12; 
Zines, supra note 48, at 24-25. 
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The modern expansion of Commonwealth power to protect the 
environment has occurred primarily in the resolution of conflicts over 
natural resources. In the 1970s, the High Court confirmed Common-
wealth power over the territorial sea.72 The Court also permitted the 
Commonwealth to rely on the trade and commerce power to disallow 
an export license on the basis of the environmental effects of the 
licensee's mining operations that generated the product to be ex-
ported.73 During the 1980s, judicial decisions further enhanced Com-
monwealth power. In 1982, the High Court recognized that the Com-
monwealth could use its external affairs power to protect Aborigines 
against discrimination by a state government.74 More recently, the 
High Court allowed the Commonwealth to use the external affairs 
and corporations powers to preclude states from damming rivers75 or 
allowing forests to be cut.76 
The High Court's decisions over the last twenty years unequivo-
cally establish the constitutional priority of Commonwealth power 
regarding conflicts over the exploitation of natural resources. In fact, 
the expansive interpretation of specific enumerated powers may, as 
it has done in the United States, ultimately render inconsequential 
the High Court's refusal to recognize an inherent power to legislate 
for matters of national concern. 
The external affairs power has been the focus of much recent at-
tention.77 This attention is not altogether surprising because the con-
temporary reach of the external affairs power is great. Not only has 
the High Court largely abandoned scrutiny of what can be the subject 
of an international agreement,78 but the court's decisions also grant 
72 New South Wales v. Commonwealth, 135 C.L.R. 337 (Austl. 1975); Bonser v. La Macchia, 
122 C.L.R. 177 (Austl. 1969). 
73 Murphyores Inc. Pty., Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 136 C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1976). 
74 Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen, 153 C.L.R. 168 (Austl. 1982). 
75 Commonwealth v. Tasmania, 158 C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1983). For a bibliography of the extensive 
literature that quickly developed over the Tasmanian Dam case, see James A. Thomson, A 
Torrent of Words: A Bibliography and Chronology on the Franklin Dam Case, 15 FED. L. REV. 
144, 149-51 (1985-86). 
76 Queensland v. Commonwealth, 167 C.L.R. 232 (Austl. 1989); Richardson v. Forestry 
Comm'n, 164 C.L.R. 261 (Austl. 1988). 
77 See Andrew C. Byrnes, The Implementation of Treaties in Australia after the Tasmanian 
Dam Case: The External Affairs Power and the Influence of Federalism, 8 B.C. INT'L & COMPo 
L. REV. 275 (1985); Bruce Davis, Federal-State Tensions in Australian Environmental Man-
agement: The World Heritage Issue, 6 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 66 (1989); Thomas W. Edmunds, 
Comment, The Queensland Rainforest and Wetlands Conflict: Australia's External Affairs 
Power-Domestic Control and International Conservation, 20 ENVTL. L. 387 (1990). 
78 See Commonwealth v. Tasmania, 158 C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1983); Crawford, supra note 51, at 
22-23. 
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Parliament considerable leeway for expansive interpretation of the 
extent of the obligations that international agreements impose on 
signatories.79 
The potential for expanding the scope of other Commonwealth 
powers is equally significant. Given the inevitable interrelationship 
between economic and environmental issues,8o the trade and com-
merce power has enormous potentiaL Foreign commerce is the goal 
of much, if not most, exploitation of natural resources. The High 
Court's modern decisions have given the Commonwealth the author-
ity to condition access to that commerce, and such conditions may 
include restrictions rooted in environmental protection. However, at 
least one commentator has suggested that the trade and commerce 
power is not unlimited.81 
The scope of Commonwealth control over interstate, as opposed to 
foreign, commerce is less certain, and this uncertainty will probably 
encourage the Commonwealth to place principal reliance on other 
powers if it seeks to expand environmental regulations in the future. 
Because the trade and commerce power extends to interstate as well 
as foreign commerce, the rationale of the High Court's foreign com-
merce decisions would seem to be equally applicable to Common-
wealth regulation of interstate commerce. However, expansion of Par-
liament's power to regulate interstate commerce is constrained by 
Section 92 of the Australian Constitution. Section 92, which applies to 
the Commonwealth as well as to the states,82 guarantees that, except 
for uniform customs duties, interstate trade and commerce "shall be 
absolutely free."83 The precise extent to which Section 92 restricts 
Commonwealth power to enact environmental legislation remains un-
clear. 
Commentators have suggested at least two ways that the restrictions 
of Section 92 might be circumvented. First, as noted below, recent 
High Court decisions invalidating state legislation under Section 92 
emphasized that the legislation had two defects: it discriminated against 
interstate commerce, and was also protectionist.84 Because the Com-
monwealth lacks the power to regulate intrastate commerce, federal 
79 Zines, supra note 48, at 20. 
80 See Martin Auster, The Harmonization of Environmental Law: A European-Australian 
Comparison, 5 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 276, 278 (1988). 
81 Zines, supra note 48, at 16-17. 
82 See Cole v. Whitfield, 165 C.L.R. 360, 396 (Austl. 1988). See generally Richard Cullen, 
Section 92: Quo Vadis?, 19 V.w. AUSTL. L. REV. 90 (1989). 
83 AUSTL. CONST. ch. IV, § 92. 
84 See infra notes 171-74 and accompanying text. 
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environmental regulations will inevitably discriminate against inter-
state commerce unless they are part of a joint, cooperative program 
with the states.85 On the other hand, the purpose of the federal regu-
lations will be environmental preservation rather than economic pro-
tectionism. Thus, the lack of a protectionist purpose may save dis-
criminatory, federal regulations if the High Court applies the two 
parts of its test conjunctively.86 
Second, older High Court decisions have distinguished between 
incidental "regulations" of interstate commerce, which are permitted 
under Section 92, and "burdens," which are forbidden.87 At least one 
commentator has suggested that the present High Court is likely "to 
take social problems of conservation and other environmental factors 
into account in determining questions of whether a particular law 
constitutes a 'regulation' or 'burden' of interstate trade."88 
The corporations power also offers possibilities for expanding the 
sweep of Commonwealth power in the natural resources context. In 
the modern world, large-scale resource exploitation is virtually cer-
tain to involve "foreign corporations" and "trading companies," both 
of which fall within the corporations power. Moreover, the Tasmanian 
Dam case recognizes broad Commonwealth authority to regulate the 
activities of those corporations that fall within the scope of the corpo-
rations power.89 
The potential reach of the power to legislate specially for any race 
is also significant. In each Commonwealth-state confrontation over 
the environment, the Commonwealth has identified Aboriginal inter-
ests at stake.90 Given the pervasive and nomadic character of the 
original Aborigine occupation of Australia, identification of Aboriginal 
interests is likely to be feasible with respect to many, perhaps most, 
future sites that are important enough to attract the attention of the 
Commonwealth. 
Curiously, the Commonwealth has made relatively little use of the 
taxing power in conflicts over natural resources, except to capture 
increased rents associated with oil and gas production off shore from 
85 See Cullen, supra note 82, at 114. 
86 Crawford, supra note 51, at 26. But see Zines, supra note 48, at 15. 
87 Zines, supra note 48, at 26, citing Hughes & Vale Proprietary, Ltd. v. New South Wales, 
93 C.L.R. 127 CAust!. 1955); Commonwealth v. Bank of New South Wales, 79 C.L.R. 497 CP.C. 
1949). 
88 Zines, supra note 48, at 27. 
891d. at 17-18. 
90 See, e.g., Queensland v. Commonwealth, 167 C.L.R. 232 CAust!. 1989); Richardson v. Forestry 
Comm'n, 164 C.L.R. 261 CAust!. 1988); Commonwealth v. Tasmania, 158 C.L.R. 1 CAust!. 1983). 
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Victoria.91 In light of the plenary nature of the Commonwealth's tax-
ing power,92 the reasons for this limited use are probably political 
rather than constitutional. 
From the perspective of an outside observer, several factors appear 
likely to limit Commonwealth dominance of natural resource issues 
and to encourage Australians to develop new institutions for Com-
monwealth-state cooperation. First, like the United States, Australia 
has a tradition of state-and, more commonly, local-control of land 
use.93 Second, unlike the United States, governmental ownership of 
publicly owned land and resources within the boundaries of the Aus-
tralian states is vested exclusively in the states rather than in the 
Commonwealth, although the Commonwealth Parliament retains ple-
nary authority over land in the Northern Territory.94 Indeed, "na-
tional" parks in Australia are generally owned and controlled by state 
governments. As a result, the Commonwealth has been able to exer-
cise authority over natural resources only through controls on the 
state governments and private parties who own the resources. The 
recent High Court decision recognizing native land rights95 may give 
the Commonwealth added power to protect areas that have never 
been alienated by the states. In addition, modern theories of the 
Commonwealth spending power probably allow the government to 
purchase land and other natural resources. However, the high cost of 
purchasing natural resources makes this approach an unlikely option. 
Third, ingrained notions of equity96 and, in some cases, constitutional 
mandate97 may require Commonwealth compensation to states and 
private parties who are denied the opportunity to exploit resources 
they own. 
To date, the expansion of Commonwealth power over the environ-
ment has focused on the use of natural resources rather than on 
91 See Richard Cullen, The Encounter Between Natural Resources and Federalism in Canada 
and Australia, 24 U.B.C.L. REV. 275, 293-94 (1990). 
92 See Crawford, supra note 51, at 17. 
93 BATES, supra note 15, at 53. See generally id. at 75-92 (describing state and local land-use 
planning efforts). 
94 AUSTL. CONST. ch. IV, § 122; Crawford, supra note 51, at 16. 
95 Mabo v. Queensland, 175 C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1992) (native land titles survive the acquisition of 
British and Australian sovereignty unless displaced by clear legislative grant). For a summary 
of the Commonwealth's initial proposal for legislation to respond to the Mabo decision, see 
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, MABo: SUMMARY GUIDE TO PROPOSED LEGISLATION ON 
NATIVE TITLE (Sept. 1993). 
96 Following the Tasmanian Dam case, the Commonwealth signed a financial agreement in 
which it agreed to pay substantial compensation to the state. See Davis, supra note 77, at 70. 
97 AUSTL. CONST. ch. I, pt. V, § 51(xxxi). 
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pollution control. The natural resources cases, however, provide a 
theoretical basis for Commonwealth intervention on matters of pollu-
tion control. 
The taxing power offers the most obvious possibility for extending 
Commonwealth powers in the area of pollution control, for few would 
deny that taxation discourages polluting behavior.98 Moreover, the 
plenary character of the taxing power was established long before the 
modern expansion of Commonwealth regulatory power in the natural 
resources context. In fact, an early article identified the taxing power 
as the most secure basis for Commonwealth controls over industrial 
pollution.99 
Other powers on which the Commonwealth has relied in the natural 
resources context could also provide conceptual frameworks for ex-
panded pollution-control regulations. While the power to legislate 
specially for any race may be of limited applicability in the pollution-
control context, there is substantial potential for transferring other 
powers from the natural resources context. 
The trade and commerce power presents a clear alternative power 
upon which Commonwealth pollution-control regulation may be based. 
No principle distinguishes mining100 from manufacturing or other forms 
of industrial production. In all three cases, the Commonwealth could 
impose controls as a prerequisite to the productive activity allowing 
the product to be sold in interstate or foreign commerce. Thus, to the 
extent that Australian commerce is interstate or international in char-
acter, the Commonwealth should have the power to condition access 
to that commerce on compliance with pollution-control standards. Of 
course, the Commonwealth would have to show a relationship be-
tween the control and interstate or foreign commerce. Moreover, 
Section 92 might limit Commonwealth power to regulate interstate 
commerce.101 
The High Court's broad interpretation of the corporations power in 
the natural resources context seems equally applicable to Common-
wealth pollution-control regulations. Trade is the ultimate aim of all 
industrial activity, and those who trade in the products of manufac-
turing and other activities fall within the Commonwealth's regulatory 
power. Moreover, the corporations power extends to state agencies 
9B Because they fear that taxation schemes will be construed as granting a "right" to pollute, 
environmentalists have generally preferred regulatory programs. 
99 Hayden Opie, Commonwealth Power to Regulate Industrial Pollution, 10 MELB. U. L. 
REV. 577, 580 (1976). 
100 See Murphyores Inc. Pty., Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 136 C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1975). 
101 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text. 
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that act as trading companies.102 Once a corporation falls within the 
reach of the corporations power, virtually all of its activities are 
subject to regulation.103 
The external affairs power is another potential source for expand-
ing Commonwealth power in the area of pollution control. Parliament 
has already used the external affairs power as the basis for a number 
of Commonwealth statutes.104 International activity with respect to 
pollution control and abatement, especially those activities pertaining 
to toxic and hazardous substances, is likely to grow. Given the High 
Court's deferential attitude toward the subject matter of-and obli-
gations imposed by-international agreements, the external affairs 
power will be a fertile ground for the development of new Common-
wealth initiatives. 
Potential Commonwealth legislation regulating the remediation of 
spills of hazardous· substances and releases from hazardous waste 
disposal sites is defensible under the current definitions of Common-
wealth powers. Because hazardous substances are the subject of in-
creasing international attention, they appear to fall within the exter-
nal affairs power.105 Moreover, hazardous substances are by-products 
of the activities of "trading ... corporations" subject to the corpora-
tions power lO6 or of others that engage in activities closely connected 
to interstate and foreign commerce.107 In addition, the taxing power 
provides an obvious basis for funding at least some of the costs of 
remediation efforts. 
The theories described in the preceding paragraphs might even 
support nationalization of tort liability for damages to people and 
property in some cases. At least when the damages involve trading 
companies, interstate or foreign commerce-or production for those 
forms of commerce-or substances that have been the subject of 
international agreements, a theoretical argument exists for expanded 
Commonwealth legislation. Nationalization of tort liability has not 
even occurred in the United States, however;lo8 lacking the contin-
102 Commonwealth v. Tasmania, 158 C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1983). 
103 Id.; Zines, supra, note 48, at 17-18. 
104 See BATES, supra note 15, at 57. 
105 AUSTL. CONST. ch. I, pt. V, § 51(xxix). 
106 Id. § 51(xx). 
I07Id. § 51(i). 
108 In recent years the Supreme Court has been extremely reluctant to recognize environ-
mental torts claims under federal law. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National 
Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 11 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 298 (1981); 
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981). See generally Kenneth M. Murchison, 
Interstate Pollution: The Need for Federal Common Law, 6 VA. J. NAT. RES. L. 1 (1986) 
(examining the role of common law doctrines in environmental litigation). 
518 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 22:503 
gency fee system that fuels tort litigation in the United States, Aus-
tralia will probably feel even less pressure for federalization in this 
area. 
Governments generally exercise new powers when they are con-
ferred. lo9 If for no other reason, therefore, Commonwealth environ-
mental legislation is likely to expand over the next two decades. 
Nonetheless, the actual extent of Commonwealth legislation is un-
likely to test the theoretical limits of recent High Court decisions in 
the near future. 
One factor that will encourage caution in expanding Commonwealth 
domination of environmental regulations is the uncertainty as to the 
limits of Commonwealth power. The preceding paragraphs offer ex-
trapolations and extensions of recent cases. Although the analysis is 
logical, the High Court might not accept it. After all, the recent 
decisions represent a significant modification of past doctrine. A court 
that regretted the centralizing impact of those decisions could cer-
tainly discover limits and exceptions to confine their reach or develop 
doctrines that limit Commonwealth power. The Australian Constitu-
tion's "just terms" provision110 could be expanded to require that the 
government pay for some regulations that regulate the rights to 
develop property. The High Court could invalidate environmental 
regulations that impact interstate commerce as inconsistent with the 
free-trade principles embodied in Section 92.111 Alternatively, the High 
Court could resurrect previously rejected limits on federal power 
such as the doctrines of the reserved powers of the states,112 or it could 
expand the immunity of state property from Commonwealth taxa-
tion.113 
Practical considerations will also blunt the drive to centralize envi-
ronmental law in Australia. Most obviously, Australia experiences 
relatively little interstate "spillover" of pollution.114 The nation has 
only one significant interstate river, the Murray-Darling system.ll5 
109 Cf. Battle, supra note 7, at 303 ("[F]ederal environmental law [in the United States] is 
perhaps the best example that power given will be used-at least by the United States 
Congress."). 
110 AUSTL. CONST. ch. I, pt. V, § 51 (xxxi). See generally Zines, supra note 48, at 28-29. 
111 AUSTL. CONST. ch. IV, § 92. See generally Cullen, supra note 82; Zines, supra note 48, at 
26-27. 
112 LANE, supra note 57, at 29; Crawford, supra note 51, at 14. 
113 AUSTL. CONST. ch. V, § 114. 
114 Auster, supra note 80, at 281; Stuart Harris & Frances Perkins, Federalism and the 
Environment: Economic Aspects, in FEDERALISM AND THE ENVIRONMENT 35, 37 (R. Mathews 
ed.,1985). 
115 See generally Sanford Clark, The River Murray Water Agreement: Peace in Our Time?, 9 
ADELAIDE L. REV. 108 (1983). 
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Most of Australia's states are large, and the country's relatively small 
population is concentrated in a few urban centers.116 As a result, the 
states that enjoy most of the benefits of pollution-causing activity also 
bear most of the environmental costs. 
Australian trade patterns also diminish the impetus for national 
pollution-control regulations. Although interstate trade is certainly 
important, it is less pervasive than in the United States. While the 
greater significance of intrastate trade is partly a consequence of the 
smaller number and larger size of Australian states, historical factors 
have also contributed. All six Australian states existed prior to fed-
eration, when the colonies had already established intracolonial trad-
ing patterns.l17 Moreover, various policies, such as colonial protection-
ism118 and differing railroad gauges,119 reinforced colonial patterns. 
The industries that generate pollution may themselves favor con-
tinued state control. Because state pollution-control agencies, like 
most Australian administrative agencies, are relatively small and weak, 
they rely on conciliatory rather than coercive strategies to induce 
compliance.12o A national environmental authority is likely to have 
greater resources to combat polluters and to be less susceptible to 
local political influence. 
Despite the influence of these forces, at least two political realities 
support greater nationalization of environmental law. First, the envi-
ronmental movement is likely to focus on national reforms. This ap-
proach allows environmental groups to concentrate their political ef-
forts and resources as well as to circumvent entrenched power in the 
least progressive states. The national approach has proved successful 
in the natural resources arena, and one can reasonably expect envi-
ronmentalists to embrace a similar strategy for pollution control. 
Second, both established businesses and states with advanced envi-
ronmental laws may favor uniform, national regulations in order to 
avoid competition from businesses that locate in states with less restric-
tive environmental regulations.121 As environmental regulations be-
116 14 THE NEW ENCYCLOP.lEDIA BRITANNICA 414 (15th ed. 1986). "The great paradox of 
Australia, however, is that in this huge continent with its small population, relatively few people 
live in the country at all. The majority of the population lives in the seven capital cities." [d. 
1!7 See LD. McNaughton, Colonial Liberalism, 1851-1892, in AUSTRALIA: A SOCIAL AND 
POLITICAL HISTORY 98, 109 (Gordon Greenwood ed., 1955). 
118 THOMAS L. McKNIGHT, AUSTRALIA'S CORNER OF THE WORLD: A GEOGRAPHICAL SUM-
MATION 91 (1970). 
119 DOUGLAS H. PIKE, AUSTRALIA: THE QUIET CONTINENT 115 (2d ed. 1970). 
120 See generally PETER GRABOSKY & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, OF MANNERS GENTLE: EN-
FORCEMENT STRATEGIES OF AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REGULATORY AGENCIES (1986). 
121 See, e.g., BATES, supra note 15, at 55 (quoting statement of New South Wales Premier). 
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come stricter in the more industrialized states, demands to avoid such 
a "race to the bottom" will probably increase. 
The most likely outcome of these conflicting pressures is a uniquely 
Australian solution that offers states a far more significant voice in 
the establishment of national standards than states have been given 
in the United States.l22 Not only is such an accommodation a logical 
result of the competing pressures summarized above, it is also con-
sistent with Australian history and recent developments. Australia 
preserved a significant role for states on the Loan Council when it 
nationalized state and Commonwealth borrowing,t23 and the Common-
wealth also respected state interests after the High Court confirmed 
federal powers over the territorial sea.l24 The recent Memorandum of 
Agreement between states and the Commonwealthl25 offers a frame-
work for the future. The memorandum creates an Environmental 
Protection Authority for the Commonwealth and envisions the crea-
tion of national pollution-control regulations. Because the Authority 
is the product of a Commonwealth-State agreement, it offers states 
a greater opportunity to participate in the creation of environmental 
standards, not simply to administer and to enforce them, which is the 
primary role of states in the United States.l26 
III. STATE POWER 
A. United States 
Under the residual theory of state power,127 the United States Con-
stitution allows states to exercise plenary authority over environ-
mental matters except to the extent that the Constitution limits their 
122 For a description of the way that the Minister for the Arts, Sport, the Environment, 
Tourism and Territories expected the Environmental Protection Authority to work, see Hon-
orable Ross Kelly, New Approaches to Environment Issues, Address to the Public Issues 
Resolution Conference in Brisbane, Queensland (Feb. 18 1991) (on file with author). Cf Battle, 
supra note 7, at 306 ("In America, co-operative federalism has come to be a euphemism. To the 
States, it means: cooperate with Uncle Sam or else.") (emphasis in original). 
123 Of course, the Commonwealth exercises a dominant role. Because the Commonwealth has 
two votes plus the deciding vote in case of a tie, it and any two states can set the policy of the 
Loan Council. 
124 Cullen, supra note 91, at 295-98. See generally Edward Fitzgerald, New South Wales v. 
Comrrwnwealth: The Australian Tidelands Controversy, 14 Loy. L.A. INT. & COMPo L.J. 25 
(1991). In the United States, Congress also granted states greater rights in off-shore lands than 
the Supreme Court recognized. Compare Submerged Land Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1988) with 
United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950), United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950), and 
United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947). 
125 See Summary of Intergovernmental Agreement, supra note 17, and accompanying text. 
126 For a summary of the role of the states, see Battle, supra note 7, at 310-11, 312-13. 
127 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (listing powers of Congress); Federalist No. 39 in THE FEDER-
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powers. As in most federal systems, the priority of federal law is the 
most significant restraint on state power. In the United States, the 
Constitution, laws made "in pursuance thereof," and treaties made 
"under the authority of the United States," are the "supreme law of 
the land ... any thing in the Constitution or laws of any state to the 
contrary notwithstanding."128 
Given the breadth of federal environmental statutes and regula-
tions in the United States, federal preemption of state power in envi-
ronmental matters has been a recurring issue in litigation.129 Although 
its opinions on preemption are far from consistent/3o the United States 
Supreme Court has generally been reluctant to find that the federal 
government has occupied an entire field merely because Congress has 
chosen to regulate some portions of the field. Instead, the Court has 
normally required that the person challenging the state law demon-
strate an express or implied conflict with some specific provision of 
federallaw.131 
Many modern environmental statutes expressly address the pre-
emption question. Most commonly, these statutes enact a rule of "floor 
preemption." This approach allows states to enforce environmental 
regulations that are equal to, or more stringent than, the applicable 
federal regulations.132 
Unfortunately, floor preemption provisions have not eliminated all 
controversies regarding the preemptive impact of federal environ-
mental law. Some statutes expressly impose a federal ceiling that 
precludes more restrictive state standards/33 and federal courts have 
ALIST 194 (Max Beloff ed., 1987). Following the adoption of the Constitution, the principle of 
residual state powers was incorporated into the Tenth Amendment, which provides: "The 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
128 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
129 E.g., Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991); English v. General 
Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990); Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 (1986); Pacific Gas & Electric 
Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983); Ray v. 
Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978). 
130 Compare, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (Noise 
Control Act preempts state or local regulation forbidding aircraft takeoffs), with Huron Portland 
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (Clean Air Act does not preempt local 
regulation of air emissions of federally licensed vessels operating on the Great Lakes). 
131 See, e.g., Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991); Pacific Gas & Elec. 
Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983); Ray v. 
Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 
U.S. 440 (1960). 
132 CWA 33 U.S. § 1370; RCRA 42 U.S.C. § 6929; CAA 42 U.S.C. § 7416. 
133 The Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act prohibits states from imposing 
"any requirements for labelling or packaging [of pesticides] in addition to or different from" 
those of the federal statute. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1988). The Clean Air Act restricts the power of 
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found preemption in other statutes that lack an express preemption 
provision.134 Moreover, despite an express reservation of state author-
ity in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act, one appellate court has interpreted the federal 
statute to preclude a state from compelling a responsible party to 
satisfy more stringent clean-up standards than the Environmental 
Protection Agency has chosen to mandate in a settlement agree-
ment.135 
Perhaps more significantly, even federal environmental statutes 
that embrace the rule of floor preemption provide states little power 
to control the interstate spillover of pollution that originates in an-
other state. Judicial decisions construing both the Clean Water Act 
and the Clean Air Act have limited the power of a state to stop the 
interstate effects of pollution that originates outside the state.136 
The primary state roles under most pollution-control statutes in the 
United States are administration and enforcement. States generally 
apply national standards to individual polluters and translate the 
individualized limits into permit conditions.137 In the process, state 
regulators sometimes exercise a fair amount of discretion in consid-
ering peculiarities of a polluter's location. States are also normally 
responsible for routine enforcement, although the federal government 
may also take direct enforcement action against violators.13s The fed-
eral government frequently relies on its spending authority to induce 
states to undertake both administration and enforcement.139 
In sum, states are significant, but definitely subordinate, actors 
with respect to pollution control in the United States. States are 
states to enforce emission standards for mobile sources that are stricter than federal standards. 
CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7453(a). 
134 See, e.g., California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490 (1990); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 
151 (1978) (federal statute regulating oil tankers); Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 
F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971) (Atomic Energy Act). 
135 United States v. Akzo Coatings of America, Inc., 949 F.2d 1409 (6th Cir. 1991). But see 
United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993) (state can enforce corrective action 
requirements under a state program approved under the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act with respect to a hazardous waste site that is also subject to a less stringent federal order 
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act). 
136 Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992) (Clean Water Act); Air Pollution Control Dist. 
v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071 (6th Cir. 1984) (Clean Air Act). 
137 E.g., CWA,33 U.S.C. § 1342(b); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6926; CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410, 7661--61f. 
138 E.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319; RCRA 42 U.S.C. § 6928; CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413. 
139 E.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1256; RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6931; CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7405. Congress 
has also used the threat of withdrawal of other funds when states elect not to fulfill their 
responsibilities under federal environmental statutes. See, e.g., CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1) 
(authority to prohibit highway grants in states that fail to adopt revised implementation plans 
under the Clean Air Act for areas that fail to meet national ambient air standards). 
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normally responsible for implementing the statutes on a day-to-day 
basis, and they may generally impose stricter controls on pollution 
sources located within their borders. However, states must ensure 
compliance with federal standards, and the federal Environmental 
Protection Agency retains oversight authority over most state deci-
sions. 
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution140 also 
restricts state legislative power even in areas where Congress has 
not regulated. The primary focus of this implied constitutionallimita-
tion under the "dormant" Commerce Clause is the prevention of dis-
crimination against interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has been 
extremely tolerant of state regulations and taxes that are facially 
nondiscriminatory.141 On the other hand, a variety of environmental 
cases have invalidated discriminatory regulations and taxes when the 
discrimination against interstate commerce is apparent on the face of 
the statute. 
For discriminatory regulations and taxes, the Supreme Court has 
applied a "virtually per se rule of invalidity."l42 Under this approach, 
a regulation or tax that discriminates against interstate commerce is 
unconstitutional unless it falls within one of two exceptions. First, 
discriminatory state regulations are permissible when the state has 
no less-discriminatory alternative for achieving a legitimate state 
interest such as environmental protection.l43 Second, the dormant 
Commerce Clause does not apply when the state acts as a market 
participant, because the Commerce Clause only restrains the taxing 
and regulatory powers of the state.l44 
The United States Constitution contains one other constraint on a 
state's power to discriminate against nonresidents.145 Under the Privi-
140 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
141 E.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 629 (1981); Minnesota v. Clover 
Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 (1981). 
142 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); see Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 
U.S. 725, 754 (1981); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 335 (1979). But see Medical Waste Assoc. 
Ltd. Partnership v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 966 F.2d 148, 150--51 (4th Cir. 1992) 
(zoning ordinance limiting medical waste disposal facility to waste generated within city and 
surrounding counties did not violate dormant Commerce Clause). 
143 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986). 
144 E.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976). For lower-court decisions 
applying the market-participant exception in the environmental context, see Swin Resource 
Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1989), em. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 
(1990); Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204, 1212 (D.R.1. 1987); Evergreen Waste 
Systems, Inc. v. Metropolitan Servo Dist., 643 F. Supp. 127, 131 (D. Ore. 1986), aff'd on other 
grounds, 820 F.2d 1482, 1484--85 (9th Cir. 1987). 
145 Cf. Cole V. Whitfield, 165 C.L.R. 360, 388, 393 (Austl. 1988) (suggesting that the guarantee 
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leges and Immunities Clause,l46 the courts apply a reasonableness 
standard to evaluate state actions that discriminate against nonresi-
dents.147 Of course, most actions that discriminate against nonresidents 
also discriminate against interstate commerce, and so plaintiffs natu-
rally prefer the stricter standard of the dormant Commerce Clause. 
As a result, the primary impact of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause in commercial cases occurs when the Commerce Clause is 
inapplicable because of the market-participant exception.l48 
The doctrine of intergovernmental immunity normally precludes 
states from taxing or regulating instrumentalities of the federal gov-
ernment.149 Because the federal government is a major landowner and 
a significant polluter, the limitation is an important one. Although 
Congress has generally waived federal immunity from state environ-
mental regulations,l50 the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted 
these waivers in a most restrictive fashion.151 
Finally, states are also subject to constitutional protection of indi-
vidual rights. As with federal legislation, the Takings Clause is the 
most important substantive limitation.1D2 Although the Equal Protec-
tion Clausel53 has not proved to be a significant restraint on state 
regulatory power,t54 environmental cases challenging state laws have 
raised constitutional issues involving the guarantee of due process,l55 
the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures,l56 the privi-
of freedom of interstate "intercourse" under Section 92 is more absolute than the protection 
afforded interstate trade). 
146 u.s. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
147 United Building & Constr. Trades Council v. City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 222 (1984). 
146 See GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 307-08 (2d ed. 1991). 
149 The seminal case establishing the principle is McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
316, 347 (1819). 
160 CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1323; RCRA 42 U.S.C. § 6961; CAA 42 U.S.C. § 7418. 
151 Department of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992); EPA v. California ex rel. State Water 
Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 227 (1976); Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 198-99 (1976). 
See generally Kenneth M. Murchison, Reforming Environmental Enforcement: Lessons From 
Twenty Years of Waiving Federal Immunity to State Regulation, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J.179 (1991); 
Kenneth M. Murchison, Waivers of Intergovernmental Immunity in Federal Environmental 
Statutes, 62 VA. L. REV. 1177 (1976). 
152 See generally Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); Nollan v. 
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of 
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. 
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). For an analysis of the 1987 decisions, see Kenneth M. 
Murchison, Local Government Law, 48 LA. L. REV. 303, 309-22 (1987). 
153 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
154 See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 467-70 (1981). 
155 E.g., Geo-Tech Reclamation Industries, Inc. v. Hamrick, 886 F.2d 662, 663--64 (4th Cir. 1989); 
State v. Gingo, 605 So. 2d 1237, 1241 (Ala. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 967 (1993). 
166 See, e.g., V-I Oil Co. v. State, 902 F.2d 1482, 1484-86 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
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lege against self-incrimination,157 and even the protection provided for 
freedom of speech.158 
B. Australia 
In Australia, as in the United States, states retain residual powers 
except as limited by the Constitution.159 On the other hand-like the 
Constitution of the United States and most other federal constitu-
tions-the Australian Constitution establishes the primacy of federal 
power. Whenever a state law "is inconsistent with a law of the Com-
monwealth," the Commonwealth law prevails and the state law is 
invalid "to the extent of the inconsistency."16o 
In applying the Inconsistency Clause, the Australian High Court 
has developed a preemption theory that is arguably broader than the 
theory embraced by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has 
generally been reluctant to find that the federal government has 
occupied an entire field merely because it has chosen to regulate some 
portions of the field. The High Court, by contrast, appears more 
willing to infer that Parliament has chosen to preempt the entire field 
that falls within the general scope of an area that is being regulated.161 
Given the paucity of Commonwealth environmental regulation in 
the past, preemption has not yet occasioned significant loss of state 
power in Australia, except in the few natural resource cases where 
the Commonwealth has specifically legislated to preclude contrary 
state action.162 If the scope of Commonwealth regulation expands in 
the future, preemption issues are certain to arise. 
The key to minimizing preemption disputes is careful drafting. 
Although the need for state control of spillover effects is less urgent 
in Australia than in the United States, states should be allowed to 
920 (1990); Los Angeles Chemical Co. v. Superior Court, 276 Cal. Rptr. 647, 653-56 (Cal. App. 
2d Dist. 1990); Commonwealth v. Lutz, 516 A.2d 339, 340--46 (Pa. 1986). 
157 United States v. Mitchell, 966 F.2d 92, 97-100 (2d Cir. 1992). 
158 See, e.g., Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 803-17 (1984); 
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); Lawlor v. Shannon, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. 
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,496, 21,496-97, (D. Mass. 1988). 
159 AUSTL. CONST. ch. I, pt. V, §§ 51, 52, ch. V, § 107. 
160 AUSTL. CONST. ch. V, § 109. 
161 See LANE, supra note 57, at 32-33. For examples of the willingness of the United States 
Supreme Court to divide the field being regulated, see Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State 
Energy Resources Conservation & Development Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983); Ray v. Atlantic 
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978). 
162 See Queensland v. Commonwealth, 167 C.L.R. 232 (Austl. 1989); Richardson v. Forestry 
Comm'n, 164 C.L.R. 261 (Austl. 1988); Commonwealth v. Tasmania, 158 C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1983); 
New South Wales v. Commonwealth, 135 C.L.R. 337 (Austl. 1975). 
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choose a cleaner environment if they are willing to pay the increased 
costs associated with greater protection. Thus, Australia should pre-
serve state authority to impose stricter standards than the Common-
wealth requires, at least with respect to pollution originating within 
the boundaries of the state.l63 Given the existence of established state 
bureaucracies, states should also retain primary responsibility for 
administering and enforcing the Commonwealth standards. 
The collaborative approach outlined in the recent Memorandum of 
Agreement between the Commonwealth and the states envisions state 
participation in the deliberative process that will produce national 
standards.l64 Although negotiated agreements may slow the difficult 
process of setting standards, they may also minimize preemption 
disputes by clarifying the expectations of the participants. In addi-
tion, involving states in the creation of federal standards may allow 
national standards to be established without the adversarial relation-
ship that has sometimes characterized federal-state relations on en-
vironmental issues in the United States. 
To the extent that agencies of the Commonwealth are significant 
polluters in Australia, a system of cooperative federalism should allow 
states to require Commonwealth agencies to comply with federal and 
state environmental standards. Requiring governments to comply 
with the same standards as private industry does more than reduce 
the pollution produced by governmental agencies. It also promotes a 
greater sense of fairness regarding the operation of the pollution-con-
trol system, and it serves as a healthy check on the reasonableness of 
the costs that government is imposing on the private sector.165 
At least two additional constitutional restraints limit the power of 
Australian states to respond to environmental problems. First, the 
Commonwealth Parliament has exclusive power to impose "duties of 
customs and of excise."166 Second, Section 92 of the Australian Consti-
tution forbids the establishment of any regulations that inhibit the 
"absolutely free" nature of interstate commerce.167 
The ban on state excises does more than forbid state sales taxes. 
Indeed, a 1983 decision of the High Court broadened the traditional 
163 An unreported case of the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales has upheld 
a conviction for polluting activity in Queensland when the polluted river flowed into New South 
Wales. See BATES, supra note 15, at 312. 
164 See Summary of Intergovernmental Agreement, supra note 17, and accompanying text. 
165 Murchison, Reforming Environmental Enforcement: Lessons from Twenty Years of Waiv-
ing Federal Immunity to State Regulation, supra note 151, at 202-03. 
166 AUSTL. CONST. ch. IV, § 90. 
167 AUSTL. CONST. ch. IV § 92; see supra notes 8~8 and accompanying text. 
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definition of excise to invalidate a pipeline operation fee that was a 
flat charge, albeit a flat charge of $10 million per year.1OO A 1989 
decision that allowed states to exact substantial "royalties" on the 
right to exploit publicly owned resources raises the possibility that 
the High Court might take a more tolerant attitude toward charges 
related to natural resources and, perhaps, pollution.169 The royalty 
decision, however, remains confined to resources owned by the state.170 
As a result, states can regulate pollution through financial charges, 
however labelled, only if the pollution fee is treated as a royalty for 
allowing the polluter to use common resources. 
The second restraint on state power to respond to environmental 
problems is Section 92-the most litigated section of the Australian 
Constitution,171 and one of the most ambiguous. As an original matter, 
the High Court might have applied a protectionist principle in con-
struing the prohibition against regulations that restrict the freedom 
of interstate commerce, but the Court's early opinions rejected that 
approach.172 Recent decisions seem to be moving toward an anti-dis-
criminatory principle that focuses on regulations that discriminate 
against interstate trade,173 although the High Court probably remains 
more willing than the United States Supreme Court to find that 
facially nondiscriminatory regulations discriminate against interstate 
commerce in practice.174 
IV. POLICY ISSUES: STANDARDS, PERMITS AND ENFORCEMENT 
A. United States 
1. Standards 
Two basic approaches exist for setting regulatory standards to 
protect the environment.175 The regulator can begin by focusing on 
168 Hermatite Petroleum Pty., Ltd. v. Victoria, 151 C.L.R. 599 (Aust!. 1983); see Crawford, 
supra note 51, at 18-19. 
169 Harper v. Minister for Sea Fisheries, 88 A.L.R. 38 (Aust!. 1989). 
170 [d.; see Crawford, supra note 51, at 19-21. 
171 Cullen, supra note 82, at 90. 
172 [d. at 92-93. 
173 See, e.g., Cole v. Whitfield, 165 C.L.R. 360 (Aust!. 1988); Cullen, supra note 82, at 124. 
174 Compare, e.g., Cast!emain Tooheys Ltd. v. South Australia, 169 C.L.R. 436 (Aust!. 1990) 
and Bath v. Alston Holdings Pty. Ltd., 165 C.L.R. 411 (Aust!. 1988) with Minnesota v. Clover 
Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) and Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1936); 
see Detmold, Australian Law: Federal Movement, 13 SYDNEY L. REV. 31, 49-53 (1991). 
176 Westman, supra note 5, at 767. Westman terms the ambient approach "technological," and 
characterizes the feasibility approach as an "ecological" one. See id. at 767-68 
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the background, or "ambient," environment. Under this approach, 
discharge or emission limits for individual polluters must be strict 
enough so that, cumulatively, they will produce the desired ambient 
environment. Alternatively, regulators can look to existing technol-
ogy to set discharge or emission limits. This "feasibility" approach 
requires polluters to make use of available technology regardless of 
the impact of the pollution on the ambient environment. 
Of course, the two methods for setting environmental standards are 
not mutually exclusive. A single statute can employ a "mixed" strat-
egy that combines both the ambient and the feasibility approaches. 
Indeed, the mixed strategy describes most contemporary environ-
mental statutes in the United States. 
Modern environmental regulation in the United States began with 
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970.176 The 1970 Amendments 
included feasibility-based standards for new sources,177 as well as 
"technology-forcing" standards for automobiles.178 Nonetheless, the 
heart of the 1970 Act was the ambient approach it embraced for 
stationary sources. 
Like all ambient-based systems, the Clean Air Act focused on spe-
cific pollutants that threaten the ambient environment. The Act di-
rected the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to iden-
tify air pollutants that originated from numerous and diverse sources 
and that existed at ambient levels sufficient to threaten public health 
or public welfare.179 For each of these pollutants, the statute directed 
the EPA to prescribe permissible levels of ambient air quality. ISO States 
were then required to establish "state implementation plans," which 
set emission standards for stationary sources. The basic requirement 
for the state implementation plans was the mandate to achieve the 
desired level of ambient air qUality.l8l For pollutants that threatened 
the public health even in very small concentrations, the 1970 Act 
directed the EPA to promulgate national emission standards, which 
176 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988 & Supp. V 1993». 
177 ld. § 4(a), 84 Stat. 1683 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7411). Technology-forcing 
requirements mandate polluters to achieve, at a specified date in the future, a degree of pollution 
control that is not feasible using the pollution-control technology in existence at the time the 
requirement is introduced. For example, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 directed 
automobile manufacturers to reduce emission levels by 90 percent by 1975. 
178 ld. § 6(a), 84 Stat. 1690, (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7521). 
179ld. § 4(a), 84 Stat. 1678 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7408). 
180 ld. § 4(a), 84 Stat. 1679 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7409). 
181ld. § 4(a), 84 Stat. 1680 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7410). 
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were to be set at a level adequate to protect the public health with a 
margin of safety.182 
'!\vo years later, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972 (FWPCA)l83 adopted a different approach to the regu-
lation of water pollution. The 1972 Act provided for the establishment 
of water quality standardsl84 and required those standards to be used 
in setting effluent limits for point sources.185 However, the focus of the 
statute was the establishment of feasibility-based standards for point 
sources. 
The FWPCA divided point sources into two broad categories: pub-
licly owned treatment works and "other" point sources. All publicly 
owned treatment works were directed to employ "secondary treat-
ment" by 1977.186 All other point sources that discharged into the 
waters of the United States were to use the "best practicable" tech-
nology by 1977 and the "best available" technology by 1983.187 The 
FWPCA also mandated that new point sources employ the "best 
available demonstrated control technology."l88 Subsequent amendments 
extended the statutory deadlines and introduced an intermediate 
level for "conventional" pollutants.189 Notwithstanding these changes, 
the feasibility-based system for controlling effluents from point sources 
remains the dominant approach of the Clean Water Act.l90 
In recent years, federal environmental laws in the United States 
have increasingly applied a mixed approach that incorporates both 
feasibility-based and ambient-based standards. Most commonly, the 
182 [d. § 4(a), 84 Stat. 1685 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7412). 
183 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993». 
184 [d. § 2, 86 Stat. 846 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1313); see also id. § 2, 86 Stat. 816 
(codified as amended at CWA 42 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (establishing a "national goal that wherever 
attainable, an interim goal of water quality which provides the protection and propagation of 
fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water be achieved by July 
1, 1983"». 
185 [d. § 2, 86 Stat. 844 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1311(b»; see also id. § 2, 86 Stat. 
846 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1312) (allowing EPA to establish effluent limits based 
on water quality). 
186 [d. § 2, 86 Stat. 844 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(B». The 1972 legislation 
called for stricter standards for 1983, but the 1983 standards for publicly owned treatment works 
were eliminated in 1981. See Pub. L. No. 97-117, § 21(b), 95 Stat. 1632 (1981). 
187 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 
844 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1311(b». 
188 [d. § 2, 86 Stat. 854 (codified as amended 33 U.S.C. § 1316). 
189 CWA, §§ 301(b)(I)(A), (2)(A), (C)-(F), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(I)(A), (2)(A), (C)-(F). 
190 [d. §§ 301(b), 306, 307, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b), 1316, 1317. The 1977 Amendments to the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act noted that the statute was "commonly referred to as" the 
Clean Water Act. See CWA, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 2, 91 Stat. 1566,1566 (1977). 
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feasibility approach establishes a uniform floor for environmental con-
trols with stricter ambient-based standards required in areas where 
the feasibility-based controls fail to produce the desired quality in the 
ambient environment. The philosophical basis for this primary focus 
on feasibility-based controls-a commitment to pollution minimization 
whenever possible-seems consistent with the "precautionary princi-
ple" that some scholars have identified as a fundamental attribute of 
modern environmental law. 191 
Feasibility-based standards currently form an important part of the 
Clean Air Act's strategy for controlling air pollution from stationary 
sources. New sources must comply with feasibility-based perform-
ance standards,192 and state implementation plans must require feasi-
bility-based controls in areas that meet federal ambient air quality 
standards193 as well as in areas that have not yet attained the federal 
standards.l94 Moreover, the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act 
embraced a feasibility-based approach for setting national emission 
standards for hazardous air pollutants.195 
Feasibility-based standards are also a significant component of the 
regulatory strategy of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. 
After the 1984 amendments to the statute, disposal of hazardous 
wastes is normally permissible only if the disposal facility handles the 
waste in accordance with feasibility-based standards established by 
the EPA.196 
Of course, feasibility-based controls may fail to produce an accept-
able ambient environment if control technology is primitive, polluters 
are numerous, a pollutant is particularly dangerous, or the pollution 
threatens an especially fragile resource. Thus, federal environmental 
statutes in the United States typically provide for the creation of 
ambient-based controls for pollution when feasibility-based stand-
ards prove inadequate to produce the desired ambient environment.197 
191 See, e.g., James Cameron & Julie Aboucher, The Precautionary Principle: A Fundamental 
Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment, 14 B.C. INT'L & 
COMPo L. REV. 1 (1991). 
192 CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7411. 
193 See id. § 7475. Section 165 of the Clean Air Act imposes best available control technologies 
for major emitting facilities. [d. § 7475(a)(4). 
194 [d. §§ 7502(c) (requiring use of all reasonably available control measures in state implemen-
tation plans for nonattainment areas), 7503 (requiring lowest achievable emission requirements 
for construction or modification of major stationary sources). 
195 [d. § 7412(d) (requiring maximum achievable control technology for major stationary 
sources that emit hazardous air pollutants). 
196 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924(d), (m). 
197 See CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a), 1288, 1329; see, e.g., id. § 1313 (water quality standards); 
see also id. § 1317(a)(2) (toxic water pollutants); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f) (hazardous air pollut-
ants). 
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Now that the feasibility-based controls of the Clean Water Act have 
largely been implemented, emphasis is shifting to problems not solved 
by existing effluent standards: the achievement of water quality stand-
ards through stricter controls on point sourcesl98 and the establish-
ment of effective controls on nonpoint sources of water pollution.l99 
Critics of feasibility-based controls have attacked them as econo-
mically inefficient. Because feasibility-based controls require use of 
available technology even if a polluter's impact on the ambient envi-
ronment is minimal,2°O the cost of pollution control may exceed the 
benefits it produces. Accepting this criticism, some commentators 
have urged greater use of market forces to allocate pollution limits 
among existing polluters.2ol The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 
embrace the market allocation approach for the special limits imposed 
on sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions to combat acid depo-
sition.202 The Clean Air Act also allows limited trading in emission 
limits established under state implementation plans.203 Nonetheless, 
most federal environmental laws continue to require adherence to 
feasibility-based standards as a regulatory minimum.204 
2. Permits 
A second trend of contemporary environmental law in the United 
States is to broaden the class of polluters who must obtain permits. 
The Clean Water Act is the paradigm: the law requires a permit for 
198 See, e.g., CWA 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313, 1314. 
199 See generally Robert D. Fentress, Comment, Nonpoint Source Pollution, Ground Water 
and the 1987 Water Quality Act: Section 208 Revisited?, 19 ENVTL. L. 807 (1989). 
200 See, e.g., William F. Pedersen, Jr., Turning the Tide on Water Quality, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
69, 82-84 (1988). 
201 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environ-
mental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991); Richard B. 
Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 153 (1988). But see Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Imple-
mentation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 
1267 (1985). For a summary of the academic dispute over economic incentives, see Joel A. Mintz, 
Economic Reform of Environmental Protection: A Brief Comment on a Recent Debate, 15 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 149 (1991). 
202 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. NO. 101-549, § 401(b), 104 Stat. 2584, 2585 
(1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (Supp. v 1993». See generally Norman W. Fitchhorn, 
Command-and-Control vs. The Market: The Potential Effects of Other Clean Air Act Require-
ments on Acid Rain Compliance, 21 ENVTL. L. 2069 (1991). 
203 See CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 172(c)(6). See generally Daniel J. Dudek & John Palmisaw, Emissions 
Trading: Why Is This Thoroughbred Hobbled? 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217 (1988); Robert W. 
Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's Emissions 
Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109 (1989). 
204 See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 131l(b); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6924(m). 
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any discharge from a point source into the waters of the United 
States.205 The approach of the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act is analogous. It requires permits for those who own or operate 
facilities for the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous wastes.206 
By contrast, the Clean Air Act originally contained no general 
permit requirement for stationary sources of air pollution,207 although 
permits were frequently required under state implementation plans. 
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 do require states to establish 
permit programs.208 However, the permit requirement established by 
the 1990 Amendments remains less universal than the one established 
in the Clean Water Act.209 
Permits are valuable for regulators, the regulated community, and 
the general public. From a regulatory standpoint, permits serve sev-
eral important purposes. They inform regulators of the extent of 
existing pollution, allow the individualization of generalized standards 
for particular polluters, provide a convenient mechanism for the as-
sessment of fees to finance the pollution-control system, and facilitate 
enforcement. For the regulated community, permits clarify what con-
stitutes compliance with environmental regulations. Even more im-
portantly, compliance with the requirements of a permit provides a 
shield against enforcement. Under most environmental statutes, com-
pliance with permit requirements is "deemed" to constitute compli-
ance with statutory and regulatory requirements.210 Finally, permits 
benefit the general public in at least two ways. They increase aware-
ness of the amount of pollution that is occurring, and they allow for 
citizen enforcement of discharge limits. 
. Ideally, a permit for a pollution source should reflect an administra-
tive decision as to the best method for minimizing the pollution from 
a particular source. Unfortunately, United States environmental law 
does not embrace such a "unified" approach to permit standards. A 
206 CWA, 33 u.s.c. §§ 1342, 1344, 1362(6), (7), (12), (14). The United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the EPA lacked the authority to exempt categories 
of point sources from the permit requirement. NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
206 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a). 
'lfYI See generally William F. Pedersen, Jr., Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1059 (1981). 
208 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 502, 104 Stat. 2635 (1990) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7661a (Supp. V 1993». See generally Timothy L. Williamson, Fitting 
Title V into the Clean Air Act: Implementing the New Operating Permit Program, 21 ENVTL. 
L. 2085 (1991). 
209 See generally Claudia Copeland, Comprehensive Clean Air and Clean Water Permits: Is 
the Glass Still Just Half Full?, 21 ENVTL. L. 2135 (1991). 
210 CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(tj. 
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separate permit system exists for each environmental statute, and 
administration of the various permit systems is divided according to 
the various receiving media. As a result, an initial effect of permit 
systems was to transfer pollution residues to other media rather than 
to develop comprehensive plans for final disposal of the residues. 
Today, regulators are generally more sensitive to the need for final 
disposal, although environmental programs remain divided along me-
dia lines. 
3. Enforcement 
Over the last two decades, enforcement of environmental laws in 
the United States has moved from a conciliatory approach to one that 
includes punitive elements.211 Although the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1970 granted the EPA increased enforcement powers, the 
amendments initially required a conference between the EPA and the 
violator before a compliance order for most violations became effec-
tive.212 Congress did not, however, include the conference requirement 
when it enacted other environmental statutes,213 and the requirement 
does not apply to all of the enforcement options currently available to 
the EPA under the Clean Air Act.214 
The punitive approach to enforcement has entailed an increased 
emphasis on the imposition of monetary penalties.215 To lessen the 
government's burden of proof and to avoid other constitutional prob-
lems,216 environmental laws typically allow the imposition of "civil" 
211 See generally William L. Andreen, The Role of Enforcement in the Transformation of U.S. 
Environmental Law (paper prepared for presentation at the International Workshop on Plan-
ning for Environmental Emergencies, London, Apr. 5-7, 1992, on file with author). 
212 Pub. L. No. 91--604, § 4(a), 84 Stat. 1687 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(4) 
(1988 & Supp. V 1993». 
213 See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a). But see CWA, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1319(a)(4) (requiring a conference with respect to a compliance order issued under the Clean 
Water Act with respect to the records, reporting and inspection requirements of 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1318). 
214 See CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a). 
216 For a summary of congressional testimony about the importance of civil penalties for 
effective enforcement of pollution-control statutes against federal agencies, see H.R. REP. No. 
1011, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-15 (1992). 
216 See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980). 
The distinction between a civil penalty and a criminal penalty is of some constitutional 
import. The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, for example, is ex-
pressly limited to "any criminal case .... " Similarly, the protection provided by the 
Sixth Amendment are available only in "criminal prosecutions .... " Other constitu-
tional protection, while not explicitly limited to one context or the other, have been so 
limited by decision of this Court. 
[d. at 248; see, e.g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938) (double jeopardy clause 
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penalties without proof of a criminal violation. One obvious goal of 
these penalties is to eliminate the economic benefit of violating regu-
latory requirements; indeed, this goal is prominent in the EPA's pen-
alty policy.217 However, only the noncompliance penalty of the Clean 
Air Act218 is based solely on the economic benefit to the polluter. Other 
penalty provisions allow consideration of factors such as the severity 
of the violation and the recalcitrance of the violator in addition to the 
economic benefit of noncompliance.219 
The EPA also supervises state enforcement efforts. Most federal 
statutes require states to assume responsibility for enforcement as a 
condition for obtaining federal approval of a state program.220 N one-
theless, the EPA retains the power to enforce the regulatory require-
ments of federal law even in states that operate programs that have 
been approved by the federal government.221 
Federal statutes have also expanded the scope of administrative 
enforcement without judicial intervention. Since the 1970s, the EPA 
has had authority to issue "compliance orders," which direct polluters 
to correct violations,222 and the federal courts have generally ruled 
that an order is not final agency action subject to judicial review.223 
More recently, Congress has allowed the EPA to impose monetary 
penalties administratively.224 Although the penalties are subject to 
judicial review,225 the agency decision is entitled to the presumption 
of regularity normally afforded to administrative determinations.226 
protects only against two criminal punishments); United States v. Regan. 232 U.S. 37, 47-48 
(1914) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt required only in criminal cases). 
217 See U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Policy on Civil Penalties, [18 Admin. Materials] Envtl. 
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 35,000, 35,083 (Feb. 16, 1984). 
218 CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7420. 
219 E.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e). 
220 E.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (b)(3); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (b)(3); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7410. 
221 See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) (requiring the EPA admin-
istrator to give notice to state "prior" to taking enforcement action under the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act in a state with an approved hazardous waste program); CAA, 42 
U.S.C. § 7413(a)(I) (requiring the Administrator to give 30 days notice to the state and the 
alleged violator before initiating an enforcement action for a violation of a state implementation 
plan or a permit under the Clean Air Act). 
222 CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a); R.C.R.A, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a). 
223 E.g., Southern Pines Ass'n v. United States, 912 F.2d 713, 716 (4th Cir. 1990) (Clean Water 
Act); Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. EPA, 554 F.2d 885, 891-92 (8th Cir. 1977) (Clean Air Act). 
224 CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a), (c); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413. See 
generally William Funk, Close Erwugh fCY/' Government WCY/'k?-Using Informal Procedures 
fCY/' Imposing Administrative Penalties, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1993) (report to the Admin-
istrative Conference of the United States examining increased use of informal procedures for 
assessing administrative penalties). 
225 CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(8); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b). 
226 E.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C § 1319(g)(8); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(4). 
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By simplifying the process for imposing monetary penalties, the ad-
ministrative penalty provisions reinforce the emerging concept that 
all significant violations of environmental regulations should impose 
financial costs on the violator sufficient to eliminate any economic 
benefit gained from noncompliance. 
At the same time Congress expanded the scope of civil penalties 
and administrative enforcement, it also increased the criminal penal-
ties for violating environmental statutes. Under both the Clean Water 
Act and the Clean Air Act, negligent violations can constitute criminal 
conduct.227 The more serious criminal penalties-which include impris-
onment for up to fifteen years and fines as large as $1 million-are, 
however, reserved for intentional violations, especially those involv-
ing hazardous substances.228 
Criminal prosecutions frequently involve intentional violations per-
taining to pollutants or wastes that are classified as hazardous.229 A 
key issue in many of these prosecutions under the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act (RCRA) has been the mental state required 
to establish a violation. Although RCRA's criminal provisions gener-
ally require that the defendant act "knowingly," they are ambiguous 
as to whether the defendant must know that the EPA has designated 
the waste as hazardous230 or that the disposal facility lacks the proper 
permit.231 The Supreme Court has not yet considered the issue, and 
the decisions of the courts of appeals are not altogether consistent.232 
Nonetheless, the reported decisions create a significant criminal ex-
posure for those who flout, and even those who ignore, the require-
ments of federal environmentallaws.233 Interestingly, federal courts 
227 CWA, 33 u.s.c. § 1319(c)(1); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(4). 
228 CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c)(2}-(7); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(d}-(e); CAA, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 7413(c)(1}-(3), (5}-(6). 
229 See, e.g., United States v. Wagner, 29 F.3d 264, 265 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Heuer, 
4 F.3d 723, 726 (9th Cir. 1993), eert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1190 (1994). 
230 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(d)(2), (5). 
231 [d. § 6928(d)(1). 
232 Compare, e.g., United States v. Speach, 968 F.2d 795, 796-97 (9th Cir. 1992) with United 
States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187, 189--97 (6th Cir. 1992), eert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1852 (1993) and 
United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc., 934 F.2d 599, 613 (5th Cir. 1991). 
233 See, e.g., United States v. Buckley, 934 F.2d 84, 88-89 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Sellers, 926 F.2d 410, 416-18 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745-46 (4th Cir.), 
eert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1307 (1990); United States v. Pozsgai, 757 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Pa. 1990), 
aff'd, 947 F.2d 938 (3d Cir. 1991). States have also expanded criminal enforcement. See, e.g., 
Waste Conversion, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 568 A.2d 738 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), appeal denied, 577 
A.2d 892 (Pa.), eert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2253 (1990); State v. Rollfink, 475 N.W.2d 575 (Wis. 1991); 
ef. United States v. Louisville Edible Oil Products, Inc., 926 F.2d 584 (6th Cir.), eert. denied, 112 
S. Ct. 177 (1991) (federal government may prosecute a company criminally even though the 
company had already paid penalties to the state for the same violation). For an analysis of the 
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To date, Australia has invested far less effort than the United 
States in establishing generalized environmental standards. Almost 
no national pollution-control standards exist. Moreover, even at the 
state level pollution-control limits have generally been established on 
a case-by-case basis using a relatively lenient "best practical" stand-
ard.235 
Australian attention to generalized standards will probably increase 
in the coming years. For one thing, the primary purpose of increasing 
federal involvement with pollution-control standards is to establish 
uniform, national standards. For another, the influence of the idea of 
"sustainable development"236 will also encourage the substitution of 
generalized standards for the case-by-case approach. 
For several reasons, Australia is likely, at least initially, to ground 
the new-and, presumably, stricter-standards in a feasibility-based 
approach rather than in an approach designed to protect attributes of 
the ambient environment. First, apparently drawing on nuisance law 
and early British statutes,237 Australians have previously used a leni-
ent, feasibility-based, test-the ''best practical" standard-to estab-
lish environmental controls on a case-by-case basis. Thus, substitut-
ing stricter feasibility-based standards-for example, requiring "best 
available" technology---can be seen as a strengthening of existing 
standards rather than the selection of a completely new approach. 
Second, although pollution is substantial in the states of New South 
Wales and Victoria, Australia's population is small. As a result, deg-
radation of the ambient environment-especially the air and water-
is much less widespread than in the United States and other developed 
dual sovereignty exception to double jeopardy that permits federal and state prosecutions with 
respect to the same criminal act, see Kenneth M. Murchison, The Dual Sovereignty Exception 
to Double Jeopardy, 14 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & Soc. CHANGE 383 (1986). 
234 See United States v. Curtis, 988 F.2d 946 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 177 (1993); see 
also RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6961a. 
285 BATES, supra note 15, at 290-93. 
236 See, e.g., id. at 6-12; Zada Lipman, Institutional Reform: The New South Wales Environ-
ment Protection Authority, 9 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 445, 445-46 (1992). 
237 See, e.g., Smoke Abatement Act, Vict. Acts 16 § 17, ch. 128 (1852). See generally Brenner, 
Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 403 (1974). 
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countries that are more densely populated. Thus, feasibility-based 
standards will often achieve ambient goals in Australia. Third, the 
feasibility-based approach tries to minimize pollution,238 and minimi-
zation is consistent with the emerging "precautionary principle" and 
a commitment to sustainable development.239 Fourth, and perhaps 
most important, the feasibility-based approach avoids granting pre-
viously unpolluted areas the competitive advantage associated with 
the greater carrying capacity of their ambient environments. 
Of course, feasibility-based controls will not produce a complete 
solution to pollution problems. In densely populated areas, feasibility-
based controls may fail to produce the desired ambient environment 
with respect to pollutants that come from diverse sources. Even small 
amounts of pollution may threaten the environment if a highly toxic 
pollutant or an especially fragile resource is involved. Where these 
types of problems exist, Australia-like the United States and, more 
recently, the United Kingdom24°-will have to add ambient-based con-
trols. Thus, the ultimate outcome of increased emphasis on general 
environmental standards is likely to be a mixed system of feasibility-
based and ambient-based controls. 
2. Permits 
At the state level, permits, or "consents," are already a common 
feature of Australian law. Planning restrictions are more universal in 
Australia than in the United States, and they generally require ad-
ministrative approval for land development proposals.241 As a result, 
requiring developers to obtain pollution-control permits from special-
ized agencies-and, more recently, from consolidated pollution-control 
authorities in some states242-was a natural outgrowth of the planning 
system. 
Permits remain an important feature of an effective system of 
pollution control.243 Permits translate generalized standards into site-
specific requirements, facilitate administration and enforcement of 
the regulatory scheme, and offer a greater degree of certainty for the 
238 See, Westman, supra note 5, at 772. 
239 See Cameron & Aboucher, supra note 191. 
240 See NATIONAL RIVERS AUTHORITY, REPORT OF THE 1990 SURVEY OF THE QUALITY OF 
RIVERS, CANALS AND ESTUARIES IN ENGLAND AND WALES 45 (1991). 
241 BATES, supra note 15, at 75-92. 
242 See Bailey & Brash, The Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA): An Experiment in 
Non-Judicial Appeals, 6 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 197 (1989). 
243 See supra text accompanying note 210. 
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regulated community. Thus, in Australia as in the United States, 
permit requirements will continue to increase. 
To the extent that permits are part of the emerging national strat-
egy for pollution control, Australia has the opportunity to move be-
yond media-specific permitting to a more comprehensive approach. 
Such a comprehensive approach would require a facility to obtain a 
single, unified permit addressing all of its pollution problems rather 
than separate permits for air emissions, water discharges, and the 
handling of hazardous waste. 
Unified permitting has the potential for gaining widespread sup-
port. For regulated industries, unified permits reduce administrative 
costs, avoid inconsistent restrictions, and, to the extent that permit 
compliance equals regulatory compliance, provide a single and com-
plete shield against enforcement. In addition, environmentalists may 
support unified permits because they allow regulators to minimize the 
total pollution of a regulated source rather than merely to transfer 
pollution residues from one media to another. 
3. Enforcement 
Criminal enforcement has recently received increased emphasis in 
Australia, especially in New South Wales.244 Nonetheless, Australian 
regulators retain a more cooperative style of enforcement than is 
common in the United States.245 The reasons for this style are diverse. 
The British model from which Australian administrative law is largely 
derived is undoubtedly one important factor, as British administrative 
law also emphasizes cooperative enforcement.246 Another important 
factor is the limited resources of most state environmental agencies 
in Australia.247 A third factor is the more restricted range of enforce-
ment options available in Australia: criminal prosecution and the civil 
action for injunctive relief remain the principal enforcement options.248 
Although pollution-control authorities also have power to revoke con-
sents and to issue pollution abatement notices,249 they lack the broad 
244 See, e.g., Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Non-compliances, AUSTL. ENV. L. 
NEWS 27 (Dec. 1992); Note, Development in New South Wales: Draft Prosecution Guidelines 
Issued, AUSTL. ENV. L. NEWS 15--17 (Mar.lApr. 1993). 
245 A cooperative style of enforcement is typical of Australian administrative agencies. See 
MARGARET ALLARS, INTRODUCTION TO AUSTRALIAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 31 (1990); 
GRABOSKY & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 120. 
246 See ALLARS, supra note 245, at 30. 
247 See GRABOSKY & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 120, at 48 (table 1). 
248 See DOUGLAS EDGAR FISHER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA: AN INTRODUCTION 
64-77 (1980). 
249 See generally BATES, supra note 15, at 311-12. See Zada Lipman, Criminal Liability 
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authority to impose civil penalties that has become common in the 
United States. 
Criminal prosecution is appropriate for egregious violations of en-
vironmental regulations, especially those that threaten public health 
or the environment. But criminal prosecution is an inefficient method 
for routine enforcement of environmental laws. Although Australia has 
not constitutionalized the protection afforded to criminal defendants 
as the United States has done,25o its system of criminal justice gener-
ally provides similar protection. Most importantly, criminal penalties 
are normally reserved for intentional wrongdoing, and the prosecutor 
must prove the criminal violation beyond a reasonable doubt.251 More-
over, if normal criminal standards are relaxed to allow more prosecu-
tions, the expanded categories of criminal liability may not serve the 
traditional criminal goals of deterrence and retribution.252 
Civil litigation is only slightly less costly than criminal litigation as 
a technique for routine enforcement of environmental laws. In civil 
litigation, the government's burden of proof is reduced, and the vio-
lator's mental state becomes less critical. Nonetheless, the time and 
resources required to conduct civil litigation mean that, as a practical 
matter, agencies reserve the civil approach for relatively serious vio-
lations. 
Revocation of a polluter's consent to operate is a powerful weapon 
for encouraging the polluter to comply with control standards. U nfor-
tunately, its power precludes its use except in cases that involve very 
serious violations. Routine enforcement requires techniques that al-
low responses proportionate to the individual infraction. 
As environmental regulations become stricter and more pervasive 
in Australia, the expansion of enforcement alternatives is imperative. 
Regular imposition of substantial monetary penalties for violations 
will be important to eliminate the financial incentive for noncompli-
ance and to keep those who comply with environmental laws from 
suffering a competitive disadvantage. To avoid the complexities of 
criminal trials, the penalties should be characterized as civil in nature. 
To be made effective, penalties should be large enough to deny the 
polluter a comparative advantage. To minimize the costs of levying 
the penalties, environmental statutes should transfer the burden of 
Under the Amended Environmental Offenses and Penalties Act 1989 (N.S.w.), 8 ENVTL. & 
PLAN. L.J. 322 (1991). 
250 See supra notes 26-29 & 144-45 and accompanying text. 
251 See Funk, supra note 224, at 30, 40. 
252Id. at 37-40. 
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seeking judicial relief to the violator by authorizing administrative 
assessment of the penalty amount. 
V. ADMINISTRATION: AGENCIES, COURTS, AND THE PUBLIC 
A. United States 
1. Administrative Authority 
Environmental regulations in the United States are extremely com-
plex.253 To some degree, this legal complexity results from the scien-
tific and technical complexity of the subject the government is trying 
to regulate and from the desire to guard against "capture" of the 
agency by the entities that are being regulated. To a considerable 
degree, however, the complexity derives from a combination of the 
nation's presidential system of government and the "cooperative fed-
eralism" that has characterized environmental regulation. 
The legislature and the executive-Congress and the President-
are elected independently in the United States. As a result, the per-
spectives of the two branches can differ markedly, as they did with 
respect to environmental matters in the 1980s.254 Moreover, the weak 
party system of the United States produces considerable competition 
between the two branches even when congressional majorities and 
the President come from the same party.255 
As noted above,256 states have important responsibilities in admin-
istering and enforcing environmental statutes, notwithstanding fed-
eral domination of environmental law and policy. Before a state can 
exercise these responsibilities, the federal EPA must approve the 
state program. Fearing the control of federal bureaucrats, states have 
demanded and received legislative standards prescribing the require-
ments that their programs must meet to secure federal approva1.257 
These competing pressures have produced detailed statutes that 
are long and complex. Not surprisingly, nearly every clause that has 
served as the basis for significant pollution-control regulations or for 
the standards for reviewing a state program has produced litigation 
253 For an illustration of the complexity, see generally Kenneth M. Murchison, Recycling 
Hazardous Waste: Time For Reform (Apr. 5, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
254 See Andreen, supra note 7, at 97-98, 102--05. 
255 Witness, for example, President Clinton's difficulty in securing enactment of the deficit 
reduction package, despite substantial Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress. 
256 See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text. 
257 See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b); CAA, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 741O(a)(2). 
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to determine its meaning. The most obvious consequence of this statu-
tory detail has been delayed achievement of statutory goals. 
Despite the statutory detail, the EPA has great discretion in setting 
substantive environmental standards. The Clean Air Act directs the 
agency to establish ambient air quality standards that are adequate 
to protect the public health and welfare,258 to review state implemen-
tation plans to ensure they will achieve the ambient standards/59 
to prescribe the "best demonstrated" technology for new stationary 
sources,260 and to identify the "maximum achievable" control technology 
for major sources that emit hazardous air pollutants.261 The Clean Water 
Act allows the EPA to establish feasibility-based effluent standards 
that apply nationwide262 and to oversee state implementation of the 
Act's permit263 and water quality standards.264 The Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act authorizes the EPA to promulgate standards 
for those who generate, transport, treat, store, and dispose of hazard-
ous waste.265 The regulations must satisfy specific statutory mandates 
regarding matters such as recordkeeping and labelling practices, use 
of the manifest system, reporting requirements, and operation of 
facilities. However, the basic requirement is that the regulation must 
be adequate to protect public health and the environment.266 
2. External Oversight 
In the United States, judicial review in courts of broad jurisdiction 
has been the primary method for ensuring the accountability of ad-
ministrative agencies. During the 1970s, Congress experimented with 
arrangements that allowed it to override environmental-and other-
regulations without completing the normal formalities of the legisla-
tive process. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that these "legisla-
tive vetoes" violated the separation of powers principle implicit in the 
United States Constitution.267 
For nearly two decades after the National Environmental Policy 
Act and the Clean Air Act were enacted in 1970, judicial decisions 
258 CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7409. 
259Id. § 7410(a)(2). 
260 ld. § 7411 
261Id. § 7412(d). 
262 CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1301 (b), 1306, 1307. 
263 I d. § § 1342, 1344. 
264 ld. § 1313. 
265 R.C.R.A, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922-tl924. 
2661d. §§ 6922(a), 6923(a), 6924(a). 
267 United States v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). 
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generally reduced the procedural obstacles to review of administra-
tive decisions affecting the environment. Recent decisions have bro-
ken this pattern with respect to the question of standing, but their 
ultimate impact remains unclear. 
Since 1970, the Supreme Court has applied a two-part test for 
standing in judicial challenges to administrative decisions. First, the 
party seeking review must demonstrate an injury resulting from the 
decision.268 Second, the party seeking review must arguably fall within 
the zone of interests that are protected by the constitutional or statu-
tory provision that provides the basis for review.269 
Sympathetic application of the two-part test has allowed judicial 
review of nearly all administrative decisions affecting the environ-
ment. In the seminal case, Sierra Club v. Morton, the Supreme Court 
refused to establish special standing rules for environmental organi-
zations, although it did recognize environmental and aesthetic loss as 
an injury for standing purposes.270 The following year, the Court found 
standing even when the environmental injury was widely shared by 
members of the public.271 The Court has also allowed organizations to 
sue on behalf of members who were injured.272 As a result, an environ-
mental organization has standing if it can identify a member who uses 
the environmental resource that the administrative decision threat-
ens to degrade. 
'!\vo recent decisions indicate that the current Supreme Court is 
less willing to confer standing on plaintiffs who challenge program-
matic decisions of federal agencies.273 In Lujan v. National Wildlife 
Federation, the Court refused to allow a general challenge to Bureau 
of Land Management decisions to reduce the environmental protec-
tion provided for federal lands; environmental plaintiffs could only 
challenge decisions with respect to specific tracts that they, or their 
members, had used.274 Similarly, the 1992 decision in Lujan v. Defend-
ers of Wildlife refused to permit a general attack on the decision of 
268 See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 165 (1970); Association of Data Processing Servo Orgs. 
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970). 
269 See Barlow, 397 U.S. at 164; Association of Data Processing Servo Orgs., 397 U.S. at 152. 
270 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972). 
271 See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proceedings, 412 U.S. 669 
(1973). 
272 Morton, 405 U.S. at 739. 
273 The Supreme Court's contraction of standing doctrine has not been confined to environ-
mental cases. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
Decisions under the National Environmental Policy Act have also displayed a reluctance to 
review the merits of programmatic decisions of agencies. See, e.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 
U.S. 390 (1976) (no judicial review until the agency has prepared a formal proposal). 
274 497 U.S. 871 (1990). 
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the Department of Interior not to require consultation under the 
Endangered Species Act with respect to United States participation 
in projects outside the nation's borders.275 Instead, a plaintiff could 
only challenge the lack of consultation with respect to a particular 
project when the plaintiff planned to make a specific use of the re-
source that was threatened by the challenged action.276 
When federal environmental law began to expand during the first 
half of the 1970s, various other procedural obstacles to judicial review 
existed in the United States. For example, the statute providing for 
federal court jurisdiction of issues of federal law contained a $10,000 
"amount in controversy" requirement until 1976.277 In addition, the 
meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act provision allowing a 
court to compel an agency to act when action was "unreasonably 
withheld or delayed"278 was uncertain. 
Congress responded to these problems by enacting specific juris-
dictional provisions of two types. One type allows review of certain 
administrative decisions, usually in the courts of appeals.279 The other 
type allows citizens to bring civil actions in federal district court-
without regard to the amount in controversy-to obtain orders direct-
ing the administrator of the EPA to perform nondiscretionary duties 
imposed by the statute under which the citizen suit was filed.280 
Early environmental decisions also used a variety of techniques to 
expand the scope of judicial review. Courts included environmental 
matters in the factors that agencies were required to consider in 
reaching their decisions,281 and they construed statutes to narrow 
agency authority to take actions that would adversely affect the en-
vironment.282 The Supreme Court allowed expanded review of facts 
regarding the scope of an agency's jurisdiction and authority, and the 
275 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992). 
276 [d. at 2137-38. 
277 Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 1,72 Stat. 415 (1955) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988 
& Supp. V 1993». The amount in controversy requirement was eliminated in actions against the 
United States by Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 2, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976), and for other actions involving 
federal questions by Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369 (1980). After the 1976 amendment, 
the Supreme Court ruled that the Administrative Procedure Act was not a jurisdictional 
statute. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). Thus, the federal question statute is essential 
to secure review under the Administrative Procedure Act when the substantive statute con-
tains no jurisdictional provision. 
278 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
279 See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6976; CAA, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7607(b )(1). 
280 See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365; RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972; CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604. 
281 Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 608 (2d 
Cir. 1965), em. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). 
282 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-17 (1971). 
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United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
developed the "hard-look" doctrine.2&'! 
By the end of the 1970s, a counter trend was clear. In addition to 
reviving the traditional deference to factual decisions and policy judg-
ments of an agency, courts also began to give increased deference to 
administrative decisions regarding matters of procedure284 and statu-
tory interpretation. In Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, the Supreme Court 
declared that courts should defer to a "reasonable" interpretation of a 
statute for which the agency was responsible unless Congress clearly 
required a different interpretation.285 
Most decisions in recent years have emphasized deference, but 
reversals of agency interpretations still occur.286 The Supreme Court 
has not yet articulated a theory to reconcile these two discordant 
doctrinal themes.287 
One can identify several factors that have probably influenced the 
tendency to defer to agency interpretations. Most obviously, the type 
of agency whose actions are being challenged has changed. Early 
cases objected to the refusal of development-oriented agencies to 
283 The hard-look doctrine attempts to provide meaningful judicial review without usurping 
the discretionary authority that Congress has granted to the administrative agency. It requires 
courts to scrutinize carefully the administrative record on which an agency's decision is based. 
When the administrative record is inadequate to provide a reasoned basis for the course of 
action that the agency has chosen, the reviewing court must set aside the administrative action 
and remand the matter to the agency for further consideration. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n 
v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 381-87, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cm. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Greater Boston Television 
Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cm. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). See generally 
William Andreen, Administrative Rulemaking in the United States: An Examination of Values 
That Have Shaped the Process, 66 CANBERRA BULL. PUB. ADMIN. 112, 114-15 (1991); Harold 
Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509 
(1974) (discussing role of courts in developing statutory environmental law); William H. Rodg-
ers, A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEOR-
GETOWN L.J. 699 (1979) (exploring hard-look doctrine). 
284 See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cm. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). 
285 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984). 
286 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588 (1994) (applica-
bility of statutory clarification of household waste exclusion in the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act); Kelly v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, reh'g denied, 25 F.3d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cm. 
denied, 115 S. Ct. 900 (1995) (scope of liability for lending institutions under Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act); American Mining Congress v. 
EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1183-85 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (denying deference to EPA's definition of hazardous 
waste under Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); cf. Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 
502 U.S. 491,112 S. Ct. 820, 831-32 (1992) (refusal to defer to Attorney General's construction 
of Voting Rights Act). 
287 For recent attempts to describe when the court is likely to defer to an administrative 
interpretation, see Dyk & Schenck, Exceptions to Chevron, 18 ADMIN. L. NEWS 1 (Winter 1993); 
Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992); Peter 
H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, 1b the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal 
Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984. 
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protect the environment; the more deferential cases of recent years 
typically involve regulatory decisions by agencies charged with envi-
ronmental protection.288 Another factor that has encouraged judicial 
deference is the breadth of administrative discretion conferred in 
modern environmental statutes.289 Similarly, the technical complexity 
of environmental problems has also induced judicial reliance on ad-
ministrative expertise. Finally, the Supreme Court-a majority of 
whose members were appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush-
may gradually have assumed a more deferential approach with re-
spect to issues of environmental law as the Court came to share the 
environmental attitudes of the Reagan and Bush administrations.290 
Changes in the rules regarding attorneys' fees have also supported 
judicial challenges to administrative decisions affecting the environ-
ment. Traditionally, the United States has followed the "American 
rule," which requires litigants to pay their own attorneys' fees regard-
less of which party prevails.291 Over the last two decades, however, 
statutory changes have substantially altered the rule in the environ-
mental context. Since the 1970s, environmental statutes have author-
ized the award of attorneys' fees in citizen suits to enforce environ-
mental statutes or to force the EPA administrator to perform 
nondiscretionary duties292 as well as in actions to review EPA deci-
sions under the Clean Water Act293 and the Clean Air Act.294 More 
recently, Congress has generalized the right to recover attorneys' fees 
in suits against the federal government where the government's po-
sition was not "substantially justified."295 
3. Public Participation 
A major aspect of environmental law in the United States has been 
the expansion of opportunities for members of the public to partici-
pate in the administrative process. To some degree, the judiciary has 
facilitated this process in its decisions expanding judicial oversight of 
288 See, e.g., Murchison, supra note 10, at 613 (suggesting that the enhanced role of the Council 
of Environmental quality is a partial explanation for the growth of judicial deference to agency 
decisions involving the National Environmental Policy Act). 
289 See supra notes 258--66 and accompanying text. 
290 Cf Frank P. Grad, Foreword, 43 WASH. U.J. URBAN & CONTEMP. L. 3, 3 (1993). 
291 For a description of the development of the American rule, see Alyeska Pipeline Service 
Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-71 (1975). 
292 See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d). 
293 CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(3). 
294 CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(0. 
295 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
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administrative decisions. Much of the expansion has, however, re-
sulted from legislative initiatives. 
The United States has long allowed public participation in the 
process of administrative rule making. The notice-and-comment pro-
visions of the Administrative Procedure Act allow public comment on 
proposed rules.296 To make the opportunity for comment meaningful, 
an agency must respond in writing to the comments before promul-
gating the rules in final form. 
The Clean Air Act establishes special procedures for rulemaking.297 
The provisions supersede the Administrative Procedure Act in rule-
makings to which they apply,298 and they also prescribe separate stand-
ards for judicial review.299 The Clean Air Act expressly declares a 
congressional intent to insure "a reasonable period for public partici-
pation of at least 30 days," except for rules for which the Act provides 
otherwise.30o 
Federal environmental statutes also offer members of the public an 
opportunity to participate in permit proceedings. Both the Clean 
Water Act and the Clean Air Act require the EPA administrator to 
provide an opportunity for a public hearing on proposed permits.30l 
Although the EPA rarely grants requests for adjudicatory hearings 
on permits, the agency will normally hold a public hearing when a 
permit attracts a significant degree of public interest.302 
Perhaps most interestingly, federal law allows citizen participa-
tion in the enforcement of environmental law. The primary vehicle 
for this participation has been the citizen suit, which has been a com-
mon feature of most environmental statutes enacted over the last 
two decades.303 The citizen suit provisions allow an individual to 
bring an action to enforce the statute after giving notice of the viola-
tion to the EPA, state officials, and the alleged violator. In the more 
recent versions of these provisions, Congress has expressly allowed 
the assessment of civil penaities304 and dispensed with the notice 
296 A.P.A., 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b), (c). See generally Andreen, supra note 283. For a recent decision 
invalidating an environmental rule for noncompliance with the notice and comment provisions, 
see Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 747-52 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
297 CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d); cf F.I.F.R.A., 7 U.S.C. § 136w (rulemaking procedures). 
298 CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(1). 
299 ld. § 7607(d)(9). 
300 ld. § 7607(h). 
301 CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)(1), (b)(3); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(6). 
302 For an illustration of how regulations for hearings for permits operate under the Clean 
Water Act, see Costle v. Pacific Legal Found., 445 U.S. 198, 203-04 (1980). 
303 See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365; RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972; CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604. 
304 See e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). 
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requirement for certain violations involving toxic or hazardous pollut-
ants.305 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has taken a restrictive view of 
the statutory citizen suit provisions. The Court interpreted the notice 
requirement of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act as a 
jurisdictional prerequisite that required dismissal of a lawsuit long 
after the litigation itself had provided actual notice of the existence 
of the violations.306 The Court also refused to allow a citizen suit to 
proceed under the Clean Water Act absent a good-faith allegation that 
the violation was continuing at the time the suit was initiated.307 
Congress has partially overruled the latter decision in subsequent 
amendments to other statutes.308 Nonetheless, recent opinions sug-
gest that the Supreme Court's restrictive approach is influencing the 
decisions of some lower federal courts on other issues involving citizen 
suits.309 Most ominously, the opinions of Justice Scalia suggest that 
constitutional doctrine may allow Congress to authorize enforcement 
only by persons who satisfy the injury requirement of standing doc-
trine.310 
As Congress has expanded agency authority to impose monetary 
penalties administratively,3l1 it has also offered an opportunity for 
citizen participation in the administrative enforcement process. Typi-
cally, these statutory provisions require that the EPA administrator 
provide an opportunity for public comment before compromising an 
administrative penalty.312 
B. Australia 
1. Administrative Authority 
Australia has no environmental statutes that approach the com-
plexity of the federal environmental statutes in the United States, 
305 See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972(b), (c); CAA, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7604(b). 
306 Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 26-27 (1989). 
307 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49, 57-58 (1987). 
308 See, e.g., CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(g), 11046 (Emergency Planning and Community Right-
to-Know Act). 
309 See, e.g., North & South Rivers Watershed Ass'n v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 555-58 
(1st Cir. 1991); Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 
1991); EPA v. City of Green Forest, 921 F.2d 1394, 1402-05 (8th Cir. 1990). 
310 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992); Gwaltney of Smithfield, 
Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49, 70-71 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment). 
311 See supra notes 213-17 and accompanying text. 
312 CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(g). 
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and expansion of Commonwealth legislation protecting the environ-
ment will not require Australia to duplicate the complexity of United 
States law. Although Australia's system of federalism is similar to 
that of the United States, the Commonwealth uses a parliamentary 
system in which ministers are responsible to Parliament. This system 
eliminates the legislative-executive conflicts that have induced Con-
gress to try to control a president who favors a different environ-
mental policy. 
Of course, the absence of interbranch conflicts will not make envi-
ronmental regulations simple. It should, however, postpone much of 
the complexity from statutes to administrative regulations, and that 
postponement should have several salutary effects. For one thing, the 
complexity will be more likely to reflect the intractability of the 
underlying environmental problem rather than the tangled nature of 
the political alliance that produced the legislation. For another, ad-
justments to changing perceptions of environmental problems should 
be easier to achieve at the administrative level than in the legislative 
process. Perhaps most importantly, simpler statutes can reinforce the 
rule of law. Courts can allow agencies a generous discretion to imple-
ment environmental policy without abandoning oversight of adminis-
trative interpretations on issues of statutory construction. 
To the extent that the Commonwealth extends the scope of its 
environmental legislation, federalism concerns are likely to encourage 
both statutory and bureaucratic complexity in Australia, much as 
they have in the United States. The system of responsible govern-
ment ensures that an Australian government will have the support of 
a parliamentary majority that could amend environmental statutes.313 
Nonetheless, states are likely to prefer grounding their roles in a 
system of cooperative federalism in the relative stability of statutory 
enactments rather than committing them to the discretion of a par-
ticular minister. Moreover, statutory enactments that give the states 
significant roles in setting environmental standards are likely to make 
Commonwealth domination of environmental policy and standards 
less complete than federal domination has been in the United States. 
The consultations such provisions are likely to mandate will require 
bureaucratic arrangements of less than optimal efficiency. 
Whatever the precise form the Australian regulatory system takes, 
the very complexity of contemporary environmental problems means 
that expanded environmental regulations are likely to increase ad-
313 Of course, the opposing party might control the Senate; and that split in legislative power 
could slow the process of legislative revision. See LANE, supra note 57, at 50. 
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ministrative discretion to control private actions. Although that en-
hanced discretion may allow for a more coordinated environmental 
policy, it will also subject the regulated community to the bureaucratic 
inequities that inevitably accompany command-and-control regula-
tions. Thus, the expansion of environmental regulations, especially at 
the federal level, is likely to direct increased attention to external 
controls of the administrative process. 
2. External Oversight 
In Australia, as in the United States during the 1970s, the role of 
the courts in reviewing administrative actions has increased in recent 
years. The pace will probably accelerate as the number of environ-
mental regulations increases. 
The doctrine of standing has evolved more gradually in Australia 
than in the United States.314 One factor that has retarded the expan-
sion of Australian doctrine has been the courts' tendency to draw 
technical distinctions that depend on the type of relief that a litigant 
seeks.315 Like the United States Supreme Court, the High Court has 
refused to confer standing on conservation organizations merely be-
cause they are interested in environmental problems.316 Unlike the 
United States Court, the Australian Court has never explicitly em-
braced environmental and aesthetic injury as a ground for standing, 
although some decisions arguably point in that direction.317 
A Law Reform Commission has proposed that standing should 
be granted to any party that is competent to represent the interest 
that is being asserted,318 and legislative revisions have diminished 
the importance of standing in federal litigation as well as in litigation 
in Victoria and New South Wales. The Commonwealth Administra-
tive Decisions (Judicial Review) Act allows any "person aggrieved" 
to appeal administrative decisions.319 That language may be flexible 
314 See generally BATES, supra note 15, at 351-73. Interestingly, standing is also a less 
significant barrier to litigants in the United Kingdom than in Australia. See ALLARS, supra note 
245, at 281-82. 
815 See ALLARs, supra note 245, at 283-84, 287-92, 294-98 (discussing tests for standing in 
prohibition and certiorari cases, requests for declaratory and injunctive relief, and suits brought 
under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act). 
316 See Australian Conservation Found. v. Commonwealth, 146 C.L.R. 493 (Austl. 1980). 
317 See, e.g., Onus v. Alcoa of Australia Ltd., 149 C.L.R. 27 (Austl. 1981); Fraser Island 
Defenders Org. v. Hervey Bay 'lbwn Council, 2 Q.R. 72 (1983). See generally ALLARs, supra 
note 245, at 289-92; BATES, supra note 15, at 357-64. 
318 See ALLARS, supra note 245, at 306-07. 
319 [d. at 294-98. 
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enough, as it has been in the United States,320 to accommodate a wide 
variety of environmental interests. The wording of the Victoria stat-
ute321 is similar, although it may represent less of a clear break with 
past doctrine. The broadest language is that of the New South Wales 
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, which allows any "per-
son" to challenge administrative decisions.322 
The legislative enactments reinforce the judicial trend. Taken to-
gether, the legislative and judicial initiatives are likely to diminish 
substantially the number of cases that are immune from judicial re-
view because no plaintiff has standing to challenge the decision. 
To an observer from the United States, the language of Australian 
doctrine on the scope of judicial review seems familiar.323 The doctrinal 
details differ, but the issues are similar. Without the aid of a constitu-
tional guarantee of due process, Australian courts require procedural 
fairness that, in some respects, appears broader than the protection 
provided by the United States Constitution.3M Similarly, the focus on 
actions beyond the limits of statutory authority or jurisdiction and the 
development of "reasonableness" review mirror concerns that have 
been influential in the United States.325 
Comparing Australia's application of the doctrine regarding scope 
of review to that of the United States is more problematic. Certainly, 
conventional wisdom describes Australian courts as less activist and 
more deferential to the legislature. On the other hand, a recent Aus-
tralian evaluation concludes that courts in the United States are more 
deferential with respect to executive interpretation of statutes.326 In 
fact, both descriptions may be accurate because Australian law has 
not experienced either swing of the pendulum that doctrines regard-
ing judicial review have undergone in the United States. 
In the early days of the development of environmental law in the 
United States, the courts were active players. As explained above, 
during the 1960s and 1970s, federal courts began to force development 
320 See A.P.A., 5 U.S.C. § 702. This section of the Administrative Procedure Act has provided 
the basis for the expansion of standing described supra in the text accompanying notes 303-05. 
321 Administrative Law Act 1978, Vict. Acts § 3; ALLARS, supra note 245, at 303. 
3.22 See BATES, supra note 15, at 368-69; Nicola Pain, Third Party Rights-Public Participa-
tion Under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (N.S. w.): Do the Floodgates 
Need Opening or Closing, 6 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 26, 26 (1989). 
323 But see Baillie, supra note 4, at 17 ("To an outsider, the American judiciary appears far 
more reluctant that its Australian counterpart to interfere in matters it considers administra-
tive, and therefore within the sole province of the executive."). 
324 See generally ALLARS, supra note 245, at 236-77; Rich, supra note 3, at 217-19. 
325 See supra notes 281-83 and accompanying text. 
326 Baillie, supra note 4, at 45. 
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agencies to consider environmental issues in their decisionmaking 
processes, and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit applied the hard-look doctrine to decisions of the 
newly created Environmental Protection Agency.327 No similar outburst 
of activism has occurred in Australia, although a recent High Court 
decision regarding Aboriginal land tenure may portend changes for 
the future.328 
Since the early 1980s, judicial review issues in the United States 
have assumed more of a constitutional focus. Throughout the decade, 
significant policy differences divided Congress and the President on 
environmental issues. As these questions reached the judiciary, the 
Supreme Court consistently decided in favor of the executive on 
questions as diverse as standing329 and the permissibility of legislative 
oversight of administrative rules.330 With respect to the scope of judi-
cial review, the Court has emphasized the deference due to executive 
interpretation of statutes.331 
Several reasons explain why no similar series of decisions has oc-
curred in Australia. The paragraphs above describe one: the lack of a 
tradition of judicial activism. Closely related is the tendency of Aus-
tralian cases to focus on administrative decisions as they apply to 
specific projects. That tendency is particularly pronounced in environ-
mental cases because so few environmental regulations exist. Finally, 
responsible government precludes the emergence of the legislative-
executive conflict that has been so important in the recent past in the 
United States. 
One commentator has proposed an approach to judicial review for 
permits that would expand the scope of judicial review consider-
ably, at least within the Land and Environment Court of New South 
Wales.332 Under this approach, the court would conduct de novo re-
view of permit decisions, with the burden of proof on the applicant for 
the permit.333 Such an approach would provide conservation organiza-
tions and members of the public a far better chance of successfully 
327 See supra notes 282--83 and accompanying text. 
328 Mabo v. Queensland, 175 C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1992) (native land titles survived acquisition of 
British and Australian sovereignty except where displaced by clear legislative grant). 
329 See supra notes 273-76 and accompanying text. 
330 See supra note 267 and accompanying text. 
331 See supra notes 284--85 and accompanying text. 
332 See generally B.J. Preston, Third Party Appeals in Environmental Matters in New South 
Wales, 60 AUSTL. L.J. 215 (1986); see also BATES, supra note 15, at 381--85. 
333 Preston, supra note 332, at 220. 
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challenging permit decisions than they currently have in Australia or 
the United States. 
The costs of litigation remain a significant obstacle for environmen-
tal plaintiffs in Australia. Australia includes attorneys' fees among the 
costs that a prevailing party is entitled to recover from the losing side, 
and also allows a defendant to apply for an order requiring the plain-
tiff to post security for these costS.334 Together, these rules can pose 
a substantial burden to a plaintiff who represents conservation rather 
than economic interests. 
Developments over the last decade or so have mitigated the rules 
regarding costs, but they have not completely eliminated their impact. 
New South Wales established a legal aid office for environmental 
matters,335 but the current economic climate has reduced its funding 
dramatically. In privately financed litigation, courts have sometimes 
denied applications for security for costs or declined to enter an order 
for costs,336 but the potential for liability undoubtedly deters individ-
ual plaintiffs who may be essential to establish standing. 
Unlike the United States, Australia has developed external checks 
on administrative actions other than judicial review. Although the 
growth of the bureaucratic state may have reduced the effectiveness 
of parliamentary oversight,337 agencies must still submit most dele-
gated legislation to Parliament before the legislation becomes effec-
tive,338 and special commissions have been created to consider major 
reforms.339 In addition, both the Commonwealth and some states have 
created ombudsmen with powers to investigate administrative in-
equities and to propose remedies.340 
From the perspective of United States environmental law, the most 
interesting development may be the appearance of tribunals that 
provide an external, quasi-judicial review on the merits of adminis-
trative decisions of the Commonwealth and some states.341 It will be 
interesting to see whether these institutions are adapted to cover 
environmental regulations, as they are expanded in Australia. The 
President of the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales 
334 BATES, supra note 15, at 382. 
335 [d. at 381. See generally Ben Boer, Legal Aid in Environmental Disputes, 3 ENVTL. & 
PLAN. L.J. 22 (1986). 
336 BATES, supra note 15, at 382--83. 
337 See ALLARS, supra note 245, at 18-19. 
338 [d. at 69--70. 
339 [d. at 65--66. 
340 [d. at 77-80, 118-19. 
34! See id. at 72-77,117-18; Bailey & Brash, supra note 242. 
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has suggested that the availability of such a mechanism for meaning-
ful review of the merits of administrative decisions may discourage 
courts from expanding the scope of their review to include the merits 
of administrative decisions.342 
The Land and Environment Court itself represents another legal 
innovation that the United States has resisted: specialized courts for 
complex technical problems.343 Even though the court is subject to the 
normal limits applicable to judicial review, its jurisdiction is limited. 
Thus, it has, to some degree, accumulated the special expertise that 
comes from concentrating on environmental matters. At least one 
legal scholar has, however, urged the Land and Environment Court 
to be more assertive in defining the limits of its jurisdiction.344 
3. Public Participation 
Expanding opportunities for public participation has been a char-
acteristic of modern environmental law in Australia as it has been in 
the United States. Many of the developments described in the pre-
ceding sections have made public involvement in administrative deci-
sions more meaningful. In addition, Australia has created a Resource 
Allocation Commission to advise the government regarding many 
development proposals, and the Commission's procedures allow for 
public input before recommendations are issued.345 Moreover, like the 
United States, Australia has a Freedom of Information Act that makes 
most Commonwealth documents available for public scrutiny.346 
In some respects, Australian law remains less sympathetic to public 
participation than United States law. As environmental standards and 
342 J.S. Cripps, Judicial Review of Environmental and Planning Laws, 13 SYDNEY L. REV. 
7, 10 (1991). 
343 In the United States, review of environmental issues of national significance has increas-
ingly been consolidated in the District of Columbia Circuit; see, e.g., RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6976(a)(1); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1); but the trend has not been universal. See, e.g., CWA 
33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (allowing appeal of administrative decisions under the Clean Water Act 
to the circuit court of appeals "for the Federal judicial district in which [the person seeking 
review] resides or does business which is directly affected by [the agency] action"). Moreover, 
the caseload of the District of Columbia Circuit is not limited to environmental issues, and much 
important environmental litigation also occurs in other circuits. 
344 See generally T.F.M. Naughton, The Limits of Jurisdiction and Locus Standi in the Land 
and Environment Court of New South Wales, 65 AUSTL. L.J. 149 (1991). 
345 For an assessment of the commission's work, see generally Brian Galligan & Georgina 
Lynch, Integrating Conservation and Development: Australia's Resource Assessment Commis-
sion and the Testing Case of Coronation Hill, 9 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 181 (1992). 
346 See ALLARS, supra note 245, at 147-60. 
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regulations expand, pressure may well mount for Australia to provide 
even more opportunities for public participation. 
Unlike the United States,347 Australia has no general requirement 
that interested persons be given an opportunity to comment before a 
Commonwealth agency finalizes proposed rules. Some states do pro-
vide for public comments, but the state requirements are usually 
enforced through parliamentary oversight rather than through judi-
cial review.348 As environmental regulations become more pervasive 
and intrusive, the regulated community as well as conservation groups 
may demand opportunities for organized participation. Australia has 
embraced a participatory approach for devising broad strategies of 
environmental policy and for making important decisions regarding 
development.349 Whether the Commonwealth and states will extend 
the approach to the details of environmental regulations remains to 
be seen. 
The approach New South Wales has adopted for enforcing its envi-
ronmental assessment legislation is similar to the citizen suits of 
United States environmental statutes but is unusual in Australian 
law.350 The New South Wales legislation allows any person to enforce 
its requirements.351 By eliminating standing as a barrier to obtaining 
judicial review, this provision enlists environmental groups as over-
seers of the government's implementation of environmental policy. 
Because Australia has made less extensive use of administrative en-
forcement of environmental regulations than the United States, Aus-
tralian law has had little occasion to define the public role in that 
process. 
The lack of general environmental standards makes the environ-
mental assessment process a more important vehicle for public par-
ticipation in the regulatory process in Australia than in the United 
States. In the United States, most of the EPA's regulatory decisions 
are exempted from the requirement to prepare an environmental 
impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Act.352 
347 See supra note 270 and accompanying text. 
348 ALLARS, supra note 245, at 27, 242-45. 
349 See, e.g., COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, NATIONAL GREENHOUSE STEERING COMM., 
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, SUMMARY REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL 
GREENHOUSE RESPONSE STRATEGY (Dec. 1993); COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, NATIONAL 
STRATEGY FOR ECOLOGICALLY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (Dec. 1992). 
350 According to one commentator, the Michigan Environmental Protection Act was the inspi-
ration for the New South Wales provision. See BATES, supra note 15, at 368. 
351Id. 
352 See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1371 (all actions under the Clean Water Act "[e]xcept for the 
provision of financial assistance for the purpose of assisting the construction of publicly owned 
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In Australia, permit decisions remain a central focus of the impact 
assessment process both at the Commonwealth level353 and in the 
states.3M As compared to the United States, the implementation of 
this process in Australia has been more administrative and bureau-
cratic than judicial. Judicial review of some issues is, however, avail-
able in New South Wales.355 Further, at least one scholar has suggested 
that the Commonwealth statute may provide substantive protection 
when judicial review is available.356 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the most obvious lesson of this overview is the demonstra-
tion that the differences between Australia and the United States 
preclude mimicry in the search for solutions to environmental prob-
lems. Following his retirement as Prime Minister in 1966, Sir Robert 
Menzies delivered a series of lectures on the Australian Constitution 
at the University of Virginia. He pronounced the differences in the 
constitutional systems of the United States and Australia as "pro-
found" and concluded that the resemblances between the two coun-
tries could easily be exaggerated.357 Sir Menzies's comments provide 
an equally accurate description of the environmental law of the two 
nations. 
The differences between the physical, cultural, and legal environ-
ments of Australia and the United States are great. Those differences 
prevent the United States from embracing the new environmental 
initiatives of Australia just as they preclude Australia from copying 
the environmental law of the United States. Each nation must solve 
its own environmental problems in light of its unique physical, cul-
tural, and legal heritage. 
treatment works"); Merrell v. Thomas, 807 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986); eert. denied, 404 U.S. 848 
(1987) (Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act); Kilroy v. Quarles, 614 F.2d 225 (9th 
Cir. 1980) (compliance schedules for the Clean Water Act permit of a publicly owned treatment 
works); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), eert. denied,417 
U.S. 921 (1974). 
363 See, e.g., Murphyores Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 136 C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 19'(6). See generally 
BATES, supra note 15, at 93-125. 
354 See Bailey & Brash, supra note 242, at 197-2Ol. 
306 See BATES, supra note 15, at 111-17. 
356 See Gary D. Meyers, Divining Common Law Standards for Environmental Protection: 
Application of the Public Trust Doctrine in The Context of Reforming NEPA and the Common-
wealth Environmental Protection Act 15 (paper presented to the Australian Centre for Envi-
ronmental Law, University of Adelaide School of Law, Aug. 26, 1992, on file with author). 
857 MENZIES, supra note 2, at 49. 
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Recognition of the significance of national differences has impor-
tance beyond the immediate comparison of Australia and the United 
States. If the need for individualized solutions applies to countries 
with as many similarities as Australia and the United States, it ap-
plies with even more force in many other nations. Australia and the 
United States share much common heritage: the English language, 
the common law, and federal systems based on written constitutions. 
If nations with these similarities must devise their own solutions to 
environmental problems, so much more will an individualized ap-
proach be necessary for nations with different languages, legal tradi-
tions, and governmental systems. As environmental problems become 
more global in nature, the developed nations must accept the need 
and power of other countries, especially less developed nations, to 
devise and to implement their own schemes for environmental pro-
tection. 
Comparative study does, however, have more value than offering a 
warning against national hegemony. Most specifically, understand-
ing how another nation, especially one with similar traditions, has 
approached environmental problems may help one break free from 
the temptation to view current institutional arrangements as inevi-
table. A new framework for approaching environmental problems 
can stimulate the imagination by demonstrating that the approach 
adopted by one's own culture is not the only approach that might be 
adopted. Without forcing inappropriate mimicry, understanding the 
solutions of another culture can encourage a new way of looking at 
old problems. That fresh approach can, in turn, prompt suggestions 
for modifying basic approaches as well as for proposing incremental 
changes. 
The United States has used command-and-control regulation as 
a device for environmental protection for more than two decades. As 
a result, the United States' experience offers Australia one model for 
implementing environmental policy. The successes with the command-
and-control model in the United States suggest ideas that might be 
modified and transplanted; its failures document mistakes that might 
be avoided. 
A major success of environmental law in the United States has been 
the establishment of minimal federal standards. Although no federal 
environmental statute has achieved all of its original goals, the federal 
minima have served at least two purposes. First, they have improved 
the quality of the ambient environment, or at least maintained exist-
ing environmental quality despite the pressures of economic growth. 
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Second, they have minimized the incentives for industries to shop for 
pollution concessions as they shop for economic incentives. 
Increasingly, feasibility-based controls have formed the core of the 
federally mandated pollution-control standards in the United States. 
Feasibility-based controls are initially attractive for a variety of rea-
sons. From an environmental standpoint, they are relatively easy to 
implement, and they usually produce relatively quick results by forc-
ing inefficient plants to modernize. At the same time, the regulated 
community avoids the threat of closure and the prospect that plants 
in less polluted areas will achieve a competitive advantage. Politically, 
developed areas, which are usually heavily populated and politically 
influential, are protected in the competition for new industry; at the 
same time, pristine areas are protected-whether the inhabitants 
want protection or not-from uncontrolled degradation. 
As time passes, the feasibility-based approach becomes less satis-
factory. The failure to achieve ambient goals frustrates environmen-
talists, while polluters complain about incurring control costs that 
produce no commensurate improvements in environmental quality. 
Increasingly, these dissatisfactions are producing a mixed system 
of pollution control in the United States. Feasibility-based require-
ments are widespread, but controls frequently stop short of the best 
technology that is available.358 That requirement is normally reserved 
for new sources359 and hazardous or toxic pollutants,360 or for situations 
where ambient goals are not likely to be achieved in the near future.361 
In addition, United States law has combined these feasibility-based 
standards with ambient goals,362 although the ambient goals have 
rarely, if ever, been achieved when the alternative is significant indus-
trial dislocation. 
The evolution of United States environmental law over the last two 
decades illustrates that enforcement is important if pollution-control 
laws are to be effective. At the governmental level, two trends are 
particularly evident. First, violators face monetary penalties as well 
as corrective orders. Unless regulatory enforcement eliminates the 
financial gains associated with violations, strict environmental regu-
lations give a perverse advantage to the polluter who delays compli-
358 See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(A), (2)(E). 
359 See CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1316(a), (b); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(4). 
360 See CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 131l(b)(2), (A), (C), (D), (F); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d). 
361 See, e.g., CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a)(4), 7479(3), 7501(3), 7503(a)(2). 
362 See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C). 
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ance until after a violation is discovered. Second, administrative en-
forcement is increasingly significant. In addition to issuing compliance 
orders, the EPA can now assess penalties administratively for many 
violations. Although violators are entitled to judicial review of the 
penalties, the violator does not receive a de novo hearing in the 
judicial proceeding. 
United States environmental statutes have also expanded the role 
of the public in overseeing the implementation and enforcement of the 
environmental policies established by Congress. Despite the restric-
tive interpretations that the Supreme Court has given to these citizen 
suit provisions, citizen suits provide a mechanism for forcing agency 
action and for redressing violations. Indeed, citizen suits may be the 
most important contribution that environmental law has made to 
administrative law theory in the United States.363 
One feature of citizen suits-allowing successful plaintiffs to re-
cover attorneys' fees-has become a common feature of environmental 
law, at least when the defendant is a governmental agency. This 
change from the traditional American rule has provided an important 
funding source for environmental litigation. If Australia wants to 
offer similar encouragement for individuals and conservation organi-
zations to litigate environmental issues, it will need to take two steps. 
First, unsuccessful litigants' exposure to costs must be reduced. Sec-
ond, some type of funding scheme must be provided to support litiga-
tion.364 
Unfortunately, environmental law in the United States is far from an 
unmitigated success story. Perhaps, however, the failures of United 
States law will be at least as useful for Australians as the successes. 
In United States environmental law, a consistent pattern appears: 
when industrial and commercial reality conflicts with environmental 
ideology, industrial and commercial reality prevails. In some cases, 
like the no-discharge goal of the Clean Water Act,365 the consequence 
may have been no greater than to disappoint the hopes of environ-
mentalists. In other areas, however, rhetorical victories have delayed 
meaningful governmental action to protect the environment. Section 
112 of the Clean Air Act is a good example. As originally enacted in 
1970, the Act directed the EPA to set national emission standards for 
363 Cf Baillie, supra note 4, at 36 ("The vitally significant difference between the United States 
anti-pollution laws and Australia's, in my opinion, is the provision for citizens' suits which is 
included in each of the United States statutes."). 
364 See Brian J. Preston, Public Enforcement of Environmental Law in Australia, 6-7 J. ENV. 
L. & LIT. 39, 61-65 (1991). 
365 CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(I). 
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hazardous air pollutants at levels adequate to protect the public health 
with a margin of safety.366 Establishing safe levels for most hazardous 
air pollutants proved, however, extremely difficult.367 Unwilling to ban 
all emissions of those pollutants, the EPA had listed only a handful of 
air pollutants as hazardous when Congress substituted a feasibility-
based scheme of regulation in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. 
Another unfortunate aspect of pollution-control legislation in the 
United States is one of its most striking features: legislative complex-
ity. To a considerable degree, the complexity is the product of the 
combination of a federal system with a constitutional tradition sepa-
rating legislative and executive powers. By making statutory law 
extremely difficult to interpret,368 the complexity encourages courts 
to abdicate responsibility for interpretation to agencies. In addition, 
the statutory detail also delays needed reform by including details of 
the regulatory scheme in the statutory text. As a practical matter, 
most reforms are delayed until the next time Congress reauthorizes 
the underlying statute, and reauthorization may not occur for a decade. 
Finally, environmental law in the United States lacks any coherent 
focus. Federal environmental statutes are compartmentalized accord-
ing to the receiving media. Although environmental statutes often 
borrow language from other environmental laws, neither administra-
tion nor enforcement of federal environmental laws is well coordi-
nated. The frustration that compartmentalization has produced is 
widespread. The regulated community complains of duplicative and 
inconsistent requirements. Environmentalists bemoan the tendency 
to transfer rather than to solve environmental problems. 
Certainly, the lessons to be learned from the comparative study of 
environmental law are not one-sided. Australia's fresh look at envi-
ronmental problems offers some new perspectives for reforming United 
States law. 
One notable aspect of Australian environmental law, its interna-
tional perspective, derives from Australia's unique system of federal-
state relations. The Commonwealth began the expansion of its regu-
latory power in the context of growing international interest in the 
preservation of cultural heritage. By contrast, the environmental law 
of the United States has remained insular in a world that is increas-
ingly interdependent.369 Australia's attention to its international obli-
366 Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 4a, 84 Stat. 1865 (1970). 
367 See NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane); ROBERT V. PERIVAL ET AL., 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 854-57 (1992). 
368 Baillie, supra note 4, at 35. 
369 Brian G. Baillie's comments regarding United States attitudes toward its system of gov-
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gations can serve as a model as to how the international arena can 
serve as a place for cooperative action rather than national hegemony. 
Throughout the twentieth century, Australia has allowed its states 
to retain a meaningful regulatory role, even as Commonwealth power 
has grown. The recent Memorandum of Agreement creating the En-
vironmental Protection Authority370 is simply the latest in a series 
of cooperative arrangements for structuring intergovernmental ar-
rangements as power has gravitated to the Commonwealth govern-
ment. At a minimum, the Australian experience demonstrates that 
"cooperative federalism" can involve far more cooperation than has 
been typical in the United States. 
In general, Australia has taken a more cooperative approach to 
environmental problems than has been common in the United States. 
The recent strategy documents for major environmental problems371 
offer an attractive alternative to the gridlock that has become increas-
ingly characteristic of environmental disputes in the United States. 
Australians may exaggerate the potential for achieving consensus 
solutions to environmental problems.372 However, the adversarial ap-
proach that has become so common in the United States may discour-
age environmentalists and regulated industries from reaching consen-
sus on any issues. 
Australia has also experimented with non-judicial mechanisms for 
controlling administrative agencies. The United States has placed 
heavy reliance on judicial review in courts of broad jurisdiction. While 
judicial review of agency decisionmaking may be less extensive in 
Australia, both the Commonwealth and the states have experimented 
with a variety of mechanisms to provide effective controls. Several of 
these experiments-specialized courts, administrative tribunals, and 
ombudsmen-could probably be successfully transported to the United 
States. 
Comparative study also offers other, more general, benefits. It cer-
tainly encourages a broader perspective on the system that the stu-
dent knows best. The expansion and bureaucratization of environ-
mental law leads inexorably to specialization and to the fragmentation 
ernment provides a partial explanation for the tendency of the United States to look inward for 
solutions to environmental problems: "[P]ublicly and privately the view that true democracy 
exists only in the United States of America is frequently expressed (despite the significantly 
greater concentration of power in the Executive than is the case in Australia and many other 
democratic countries)." Id. at 15. 
370 Summary of Intergovernmental Agreement, supra note 17. 
371 See supra note 349 and accompanying text 
372 See, e.g., Galligan & Lynch, supra note 345. 
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of knowledge that specialization engenders. To compare one's own 
legal system to another combats that fragmentation. One must sum-
marize without the qualifications that the specialist demands, and one 
must search for themes that transcend specific legislative, judicial, or 
bureaucratic decisions. In short, one must try to understand the sys-
tem, not just know its parts. 
Finally, comparative study offers an opportunity to identify trends 
that transcend national differences. This comparison of environmental 
law in Australia and the United States suggests at least four. First, 
environmental law appears to be exerting a centralizing influence, 
reinforcing in both countries trends that have dominated political life 
in the twentieth century. Second, pollution minimization-what has 
been called the "precautionary principle"373-appears to be emerging 
as a fundamental guide for selecting environmental policy. Third, 
permits are becoming an increasingly ubiquitous method of adminis-
tering environmental policy because they offer benefits to regulators, 
the regulated community, and environmental activists. Fourth, rights 
of citizen participation in the formulation, administration, and enforce-
ment of environmental policy are being expanded; these new rights 
transcend the traditional focus on protecting the property rights of 
landowners. 
Identifying trends and predicting future paths of development is 
often problematic. One can, however, offer at least one prediction with 
some confidence: environmental controls will increase in both the 
United States and Australia. The challenge will be to make those 
controls effective while minimizing their adverse impacts on economic 
development. The comparative approach is one vehicle for meeting 
that challenge. 
373 See generally Cameron & Aboucher, supra note 191. 
